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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ordinarily, individual shareholders are immune from liability arising 
from a corporation’s activities through the doctrine of limited liability.2  
That is, absent a personal breach of duty either in contract or in tort, an 
individual shareholder is only financially exposed to judgments against, 
or debts of, the corporation up to the shareholder’s investment.3  All 
rules, of course, have exceptions.  The most frequently litigated of those 
exceptions is the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.4 
                                                     
* Associate Dean of Assessment & Assistant Professor of Law, Lincoln Memorial 
University-Duncan School of Law.  I would like to thank Dean Sydney A. Beckman and Professors 
J. Kirkland Grant and Barnali Choudhury for their thoughts and criticisms on this Article.  Special 
thanks to Professor Sheila B. Scheuerman for both reviewing this Article and forcing me to work 
harder and be better.  I would also like to thank Librarian David C. Walker and research assistants 
Jennifer Price and Patrick Slaughter for their research assistance. 
 1. The title references works by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson.  See THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“But what is government itself, but the 
greatest of all reflections on human nature?  If men were angels, no government would be necessary.  
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be 
necessary.”); Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES 
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1902, 321, 322 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897) 
(“Sometimes it is said that man cannot be trusted with the government of himself.  Can he, then, be 
trusted with the government of others?  Or have we found angels in the forms of kings to govern 
him?”). 
 2. E.g., Patricia A. Carteaux, Note, Corporations—Shareholder Liability—Louisiana Adopts a 
Balancing Test for Piercing the Corporate Veil, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (1984); Douglas J. 
Gardner, Comment, An Innovative Approach to Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Introduction to the 
Individual Factor and Cumulative Effects Analysis, 25 LAND & WATER L. REV. 563, 563 (1990). 
 3. E.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 79 
(2005); Rebecca J. Huss, Revamping Veil Piercing for All Limited Liability Entities: Forcing the 
Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory Age, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 103 (2001); Sung Bae Kim, A 
Comparison of the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the United States and in South Korea, 
3 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 73, 73 (1995); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An 
Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1036 (1991); Gardner, supra note 2, at 563. 
 4. Sandra K. Miller, Piercing the Corporate Veil Among Affiliated Companies in the 
European Community and in the U.S.: A Comparative Analysis of U.S., German, and U.K. Veil-
Piercing Approaches, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 73, 77 (1998); Stephen B. Presser, The Bogalusa Explosion, 
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Notwithstanding the frequent litigation surrounding the doctrine5 and 
the “bright-line rules” courts have created to cabin the doctrine, disparate 
results frequently occur both within jurisdictions and between 
jurisdictions6 as—in most cases—courts use a factors analysis to 
determine when piercing is proper.7  These disparate results have led to 
concerns by corporate scholars8 because the lack of predictability and 
consistency in the doctrine’s application causes concerns as a matter of 
justice, as a matter of logical consistency, and, perhaps most practically, 
as a matter of counseling clients9 to avoid this unruly beast. 
This Article argues that jurisdictions could make the piercing 
doctrine predictable and consistent by adopting a conjunctive test 
requiring objective criteria for the elements of injustice, unity, causation, 
and insolvency.  Part II of this Article briefly discusses the historical 
roots of the piercing doctrine, indicating its origination and the typical 
                                                                                                                       
“Single Business Enterprise,” “Alter Ego,” and Other Errors: Academics, Economics, Democracy, 
and Shareholder Limited Liability: Back Towards a Unitary “Abuse” Theory of Piercing the 
Corporate Veil, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 405, 411 (2006); Thompson, supra note 3, at 1036. 
 5. Commentators have described the use of the doctrine as “rare.”  See Bainbridge, supra note 
3, at 78; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985).  Contra Mark A. Olthoff, Beyond the Form—Should the Corporate Veil 
Be Pierced?, 64 UMKC L. REV. 311, 311 (1995) (“The doctrine of ‘piercing the corporate veil’ is a 
frequently used but not necessarily well understood concept.”).  Nonetheless, the doctrine is litigated 
more than any other issue in corporate law.  Daniel J. Morrissey, Piercing All the Veils: Applying an 
Established Doctrine to a New Business Order, 32 J. CORP. L. 529, 541–42 (2007); Presser, supra 
note 4, at 411 (“The critics of the doctrine are wrong that cases raising veil-piercing issues are rare.  
In fact, the problem is one of the most frequently litigated in all of corporate law.”); Thompson, 
supra note 3, at 1036. 
 6. Carteaux, supra note 2, at 1092 (“The inconsistent articulation and application of these 
theories have left the law of piercing the corporate veil in hopeless disarray in many jurisdictions.”); 
see also Huss, supra note 3, at 110 (“Each state (and sometimes even an individual court within a 
state) has a different view on the appropriate circumstances for piercing the veil.”). 
 7. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 507 (2001) (“[Veil 
piercing is] an area all too often characterized by ambiguity, unpredictability, and even a seeming 
degree of randomness.”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 89 (“‘Piercing’ seems to happen 
freakishly.  Like lightning, it is rare, severe, and unprincipled.”); Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified 
Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589, 620 
(1975); Thompson, supra note 3, at 1037. 
 8. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 78; Huss, supra note 3, at 108–10; John H. Matheson & 
Raymond B. Eby, The Doctrine of Piercing the Veil in an Era of Multiple Limited Liability Entities: 
An Opportunity to Codify the Test for Waiving Owners’ Limited-Liability Protection, 75 WASH. L. 
REV. 147, 150 (2000); David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the 
Limits of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1307 (2007); Morrissey, supra note 5, at 532; 
Presser, supra note 4, at 411; Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil: Is the Common Law the 
Problem?, 37 CONN. L. REV. 619, 619–20 (2005); Aaron Dean Wiles, Jr., Comment, The Tortious 
Conduct Exception: Holding Limited Liability Companies Accountable for Their Misconducts in 
Light of Estate of Countryman v. Farmers Cooperative Ass’n, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1065, 1066–67 
(2006). 
 9. See Miller, supra note 4, at 112 (“The degree of judicial discretion surrounding the law of 
entity recognition poses a distinct challenge to the business planner in search of predictability in the 
law.”). 
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categorizations and classifications of its various incarnations.  Part II 
further reviews each state’s classifications of the piercing doctrine, 
ultimately finding the traditional classifications are generally lip service 
used to mask an unguided, and inconsistently applied, factors test.  Part 
III of this Article explains the importance of establishing guidelines for 
the doctrine’s use that will promote the goals of consistency and 
predictability.  Part IV of this Article discusses four remedies other 
scholars have advocated to alleviate the doctrine’s predictability 
concerns.  Part IV further discusses the deficiencies of each of those 
proposals.  Finally, Part V argues jurisdictions can cabin the doctrine 
through the introduction of a four-part conjunctive test.  First, the 
proposed test requires an injustice prong, compelling plaintiffs to 
demonstrate the corporation engaged in fraud, engaged in 
misrepresentation, or undercapitalized the corporation.  Special emphasis 
is provided to the element of undercapitalization and a novel method of 
generating an objective test for determining undercapitalization.  
Ultimately, the Article advocates adopting the tort doctrine of custom as 
a mechanism to contain the discretion otherwise rampant in 
undercapitalization determinations.  Second, the proposed test requires 
an objective unity element that is premised upon control over the 
decision-making process.  This element dispenses with the notion of 
seeking to determine which shareholder has corporate unity and instead 
focuses the piercing analysis on which shareholder or shareholders have 
unity with the decision giving rise to liability.  Third, the proposed test 
requires a causal element, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate the 
inequitable conduct gave rise to the plaintiff’s harm.  This element 
incorporates but-for causation and proximate causation into the piercing 
test.  Finally, the proposed test requires an insolvency element, requiring 
plaintiffs to prove the corporation is insolvent to pay the plaintiffs’ 
damages. 
II. THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE PIERCING DOCTRINE 
Limited liability is a bedrock feature of corporate law10 for it 
encourages diversification and liquidity,11 promotes market efficiency,12 
                                                     
 10. See 45 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Corporations § 1, at 7 (1998) (“A fundamental 
principle of Anglo-American law is that a corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its 
shareholders. . . . This concept of limited liability has been called the most attractive feature of the 
corporation. . . . and must therefore be credited with a significant role in the industrial revolution and 
the subsequent development of global economy.”) 
 11. See Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 490–91; John P. Glode, Piercing the Corporate Veil in 
Wyoming—An Update, 3 WYO. L. REV. 133, 134–35 (2003); Huss, supra note 3, at 105–06; Millon, 
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and decreases the need for monitoring agents and officers.13  Although 
the origins of limited liability are unclear and have become the subject of 
scholarly debate,14 it is clear that limited liability began in the United 
States as a fairly rare event achieved through an individual act of the 
legislature for special, usually infrastructural projects.15  That changed 
with the Industrial Revolution, and by the 1840s, the majority of 
jurisdictions in the United States had adopted some form of limited 
liability for incorporated entities, embracing the notion that limited 
liability would encourage investment as well as increase competitiveness 
in business markets.16  With the growth of limited liability as a statutory  
 
                                                                                                                       
supra note 8, at 1312; Daniel Q. Posin, Turning Green: Louisiana’s Piercing-the-Corporate-Veil 
Jurisprudence and Its Economic Effects, 79 TUL. L. REV. 311, 314 (2004); Thompson, supra note 3, 
at 1040 (“Limited liability encourages development of public markets for stocks and thus helps make 
possible the liquidity and diversification benefits that investors receive from those markets.”); 
Bradley C. Reed, Note, Clearing Away the Mist: Suggestions for Developing a Principled Veil 
Piercing Doctrine in China, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1643, 1646–48 (2006). 
 12. See Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 490–91; Glode, supra note 11, at 134; Huss, supra note 3, 
at 105; Millon, supra note 8, at 1312; Posin, supra note 11, at 314–15; Reed, supra note 11, at 1646. 
 13. See Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 490–91; Huss, supra note 3, at 105; Millon, supra note 8, 
at 1313; Morrissey, supra note 5, at 536–41; Posin, supra note 11, at 314–15; Reed, supra note 11, 
at 1647. 
 14. Rutherford B. Campbell, Limited Liability for Corporate Shareholders: Myth or Matter-of-
Fact, 63 KY. L.J. 23, 24 (1975). 
 15. See Morrissey, supra note 5, at 534. 
 16. Huss, supra note 3, at 103–04; see also Morrissey, supra note 5, at 534 (“As the industrial 
revolution began in earnest in the U.S. around 1825, businesses began to need capital from 
widespread investors.  At that time, corporate statutes first started providing limited liability for 
shareholders.”).  For recent information regarding an individual jurisdiction’s limited liability status, 
see ALA. CODE § 10-2B-6.22 (1999); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 10.06.438 (West 2007); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 10-622 (2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-622 (West 2004); CAL. CORP. CODE § 17101 
(West 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-106-203 (West 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-673 
(West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 162 (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0622 (West 2007); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-622 (West 2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-87 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 30-1-622 (West 2006); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 310/23 (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN.  
§ 23-1-26-3 (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.622 (West 1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.  
§ 271B.6-220 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:93 (1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13C,  
§ 623 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-215 (West 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.  
§ 450.1317 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.425 (West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-
6.22 (West 1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 347.057 (West 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-534 (2009); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2041 (2009); NEV. CONST. art. 8, § 3; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:6.22 
(1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5–30 (West 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-25 (West 2003); N.Y. 
BUS. CORP. LAW § 628 (MCKinney 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-6-22 (West 2000); N.D. 
CENT. CODE ANN. § 10-19.1-69 (West 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.18 (West 2009); OR. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.151 (West 2003); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1526 (Supp. 2010); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 33-6-220 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-1A-622 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-16-203 
(West 2010); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.114 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-622 
(West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 6.22 (West 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-644 (West 2007); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.06.220 (West 1994); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31D-6-622 (West 2002); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0622 (Supp. 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-622 (West 2007). 
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norm, courts began to recognize situations where limited liability created 
inequitable results, and, as a reaction, developed the piercing doctrine.17 
Theoretically, the piercing doctrine is nothing more than a judicially 
created equitable remedy,18 permitting plaintiffs to look beyond an 
entity’s limited liability when the entity or its owners have failed to 
behave in a manner consistent with legitimate corporate institutions.19  
The rub, of course, has always been in determining what circumstances 
constitute a failure to act legitimately.20  While the courts have generated 
various tests to determine under what circumstances a corporation is not 
acting legitimately, very little consensus exists.21  Furthermore, while 
scholars have attempted to organize the tests into concrete categories, the 
similarities of those tests tend to overshadow their differences.  
Specifically, various scholars and courts have denominated three types of 
tests22—the alter ego test,23 the instrumentality test,24 and the injustice or 
                                                     
 17. See Glenn D. West & Stacie L. Cargill, Corporations, 62 SMU L. REV. 1057, 1060 (2009). 
 18. Although limited liability exists statutorily for incorporated entities in every jurisdiction in 
the United States, the piercing doctrine is not a legislative exception to most of those statutes.  See 
Thompson, supra note 3, at 1041 (“Almost all state corporations statutes simply ignore the whole 
idea of piercing the corporate veil.”).  Furthermore, the piercing doctrine is not an independent 
legislative construct in most United States jurisdictions.  Morrissey, supra note 5, at 542 (“State 
statutes typically provide limited liability for shareholders unqualified by any reference to [the 
piercing doctrine].”).  Instead, the piercing doctrine is a judicial exception created through the 
court’s equity powers.  FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 1.5.1, at 70 (2000); Kenneth 
B. Watt, Comment, Piercing the Corporate Veil: A Need for Clarification of Oklahoma’s Approach, 
28 TULSA L.J. 869, 870 (1993) (“Courts pierce the corporate veil in order to protect third party 
plaintiffs from unjust injury by the corporation, and most jurisdictions recognize the doctrine as an 
equitable concept.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Henry W. Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 
CALIF. L. REV. 12, 19 (1925) (stating the test is whether the corporation used the corporation in good 
faith for legitimate ends); Presser, supra note 4, at 407 (“It is, or at least once was and ought again to 
be, hornbook law that a shareholder or a parent corporation should not lose the protection of limited 
liability unless that shareholder or parent has somehow ‘abused’ the corporate form.”).  Other 
scholars have defined the doctrine as a judicially created mechanism that ostensibly addresses 
excessive externalizing by companies who would otherwise possess limited liability.  See, e.g., 
Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 77. 
 20. See Presser, supra note 4, at 412 ([t]here is no consensus on what constitutes ‘abuse.’  
There are some jurisdictions that have [required] . . . proof of actual fraud before the shield of 
limited liability is removed.  In other jurisdictions, fraud is not required, and some other ‘injustice,’ 
‘illegality,’ or ‘inequity’ is all that is necessary to pierce the corporate veil.”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Campbell, supra note 14, at 33–37. 
 23. Matthew D. Caudill, Piercing the Corporate Veil of a New York Not-For-Profit 
Corporation, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 449, 464–65 (2003).  The elements of the alter ego test 
are 
(1) that the corporation is not only influenced by the owners, but also that there is such 
unity of ownership and interest that their separateness has ceased; and (2) that the facts 
are such that an adherence to the normal attributes, . . . treatment as a separate entity, of 
separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or promote injustice. 
White v. Winchester Land Dev. Corp., 584 S.W.2d 56, 61–62 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (citing G.E.J. 
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equity test.25  Nevertheless, most states explicitly or implicitly use all or 
portions of all three tests in their individual piercing jurisprudence.26  In 
the final analysis, while some states have paid lip service to the idea of a 
multipart conjunctive test, these denominations are “useless 
metaphors,”27 and most states have settled for a factors test,28 permitting 
                                                                                                                       
Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749, 756 (9th Cir. 1962)).  To the extent a discernable 
difference exists between this test and the instrumentality test, this test is usually used to pierce 
vertically—in situations where a corporation is owned by one or more individual shareholders.  
Marilyn Blumberg Cane & Robert Burnett, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Florida: Defining 
Improper Conduct, 21 NOVA L. REV. 663, 667 (1997). 
 24. Caudill, supra note 23, at 465–66.  The instrumentality test was first introduced by 
Professor Powell in 1931 and required the finding of three elements.  Campbell, supra note 14, at 33 
(citing P. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS (1931)).  First, the corporation must 
be a mere instrumentality of the shareholder.  Id.  Second, the shareholder must have exercised 
control over the corporation in a manner that harmed the plaintiff.  Id.  Finally, the refusal to 
disregard the corporate shell must subject the plaintiff to unjust loss.  Id.  To the extent a discernable 
difference exists between this test and the alter ego test, this test is typically used to pierce 
horizontally—when a corporation is owned by one or more corporations.  Cane & Burnett, supra 
note 23, at 667. 
 25. Caudill, supra note 23, at 466 (stating the types of tests).  The equity test has a variety of 
formulations but generally takes the form of a factors test that focuses on the element of inequity.  
See id. 
 26. See Michael J. Gaertner, Note, Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should Corporation 
Owners Have It Both Ways?, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 667, 668 (1989); see also, e.g., Angelo 
Tomasso, Inc. v. Armor Const. & Paving, Inc., 447 A.2d 406, 410 (Conn. 1982) (using the 
instrumentality, alter ego, and injustice language); Escobedo v. BHM Health Assocs., 818 N.E.2d 
930, 933 (Ind. 2004) (using the instrumentality, alter ego, and injustice language); Kvassay v. 
Murray, 808 P.2d 896, 904 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (using the instrumentality, alter ego, and injustice 
language); Saidawi v. Giovanni’s Little Place, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 501, 504–05 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) 
(using the instrumentality, alter ego, and injustice language); Berlin v. Boedecker, 887 P.2d 1180, 
1188 (Mont. 1994) (using the instrumentality, alter ego, and injustice language); Scott v. AZL Res., 
Inc., 753 P.2d 897, 900 (N.M. 1988) (using the instrumentality, alter ego, and injustice language); 
John John, LLC v. Exit 63 Dev., LLC, 826 N.Y.S.2d 657, 659 (App. Div. 2006) (using the 
instrumentality and alter ego language); Monteau v. Reis Trucking & Constr., Inc., 553 S.E.2d 709, 
712 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (using the instrumentality, alter ego, and injustice language); Amfac 
Foods, Inc. v. Int’l Sys. & Controls Corp., 654 P.2d 1092, 1099 (Or. 1982) (using the 
instrumentality, alter ego, and injustice language); R & B Elec. Co. v. Amco Constr. Co., 471 A.2d 
1351, 1354–55 (R.I. 1984) (using the instrumentality, alter ego, and injustice language); Ethan Dairy 
Prods. v. Austin, 448 N.W.2d 226, 230 (S.D. 1989) (using the instrumentality, alter ego, and 
injustice language); Oak Ridge Auto Repair Serv. v. City Fin. Co., 425 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1967) (using the instrumentality, alter ego, and injustice language); Mancorp, Inc. v. 
Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226, 227–28 (Tex. 1990) (using the instrumentality, alter ego, and injustice 
language); Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 26 (Utah 
1990) (using the instrumentality, alter ego, and injustice language); Miles v. CEC Homes, Inc., 753 
P.2d 1021, 1023–24 (Wyo. 1988) (using the instrumentality, alter ego, and injustice language); 
Miller, supra note 4, at 91 (“[T]he ‘instrumentality’ theory, the ‘alter ego’ theory, and the ‘identity’ 
theory . . . are not helpful in light of the numerous descriptive phrases that are used, apparently 
interchangeably, by the courts.  Some courts have abandoned all efforts to articulate a theory and 
instead take a ‘laundry list’ approach to the identification of factors likely to justify veil-
piercing . . . .”). 
 27. Cane & Burnett, supra note 23, at 667. 
 28. See Econ Mktg., Inc. v. Leisure Am. Resorts, Inc., 664 So. 2d 869, 870 (Ala. 1994); Murat 
v. F/V Shelikof Strait, 793 P.2d 69, 76 (Alaska 1990); Anderson v. Stewart, 234 S.W.3d 295, 298 
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trial courts to consider, ignore, and weigh various factors as the situation 
necessitates.29  Of course, because these decisions are necessarily 
                                                                                                                       
(Ark. 2006); Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Gardner, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 918, 922 (Ct. App. 1992); Estate of 
Raleigh v. Mitchell, 947 A.2d 464, 470–71 (D.C. 2008); Graham v. Palmtop Props., Inc., 645 S.E.2d 
343, 346 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); Robert’s Haw. Sch. Bus, Inc. v. Laupahoehoe Transp. Co., 982 P.2d 
853, 871 (Haw. 1999); Hutchison v. Anderson, 950 P.2d 1275, 1279 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997); 
Cosgrove Distribs., Inc. v. Haff, 798 N.E.2d 139, 141 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Escobedo, 818 N.E.2d at 
933; Kvassay, 808 P.2d at 904; White v. Winchester Land Dev. Corp., 584 S.W.2d 56, 62 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1979); Pine Tree Assocs. v. Doctors’ Assocs., 654 So. 2d 735, 738–39 (La. Ct. App. 1995); 
Johnson v. Exclusive Props. Unlimited, 720 A.2d 568, 571 (Me. 1998); Evans v. Multicon Constr. 
Corp., 574 N.E.2d 395, 398 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991); Hoyt Props., Inc. v. Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C., 736 
N.W.2d 313, 318–19 (Minn. 2007); Hardy v. Brock, 826 So. 2d 71, 75 (Miss. 2002); Medlock v. 
Medlock, 642 N.W.2d 113, 124 (Neb. 2002); Lorenz v. Beltio, Ltd., 963 P.2d 488, 497 (Nev. 1998); 
Verni ex rel. Burstein v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc., 903 A.2d 475, 498 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2006); Scott, 753 P.2d at 900–01; E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Sandpebble Builders, Inc., 
884 N.Y.S.2d 94, 99 (App. Div. 2009); Atl. Tobacco Co. v. Honeycutt, 398 S.E.2d 641, 643 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1990); Coughlin Constr. Co. v. Nu-Tec Indus., Inc., 755 N.W.2d 867, 873 (N.D. 2008); 
Lewis v. Cent. Okla. Med. Grp., Inc., 998 P.2d 202, 206 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999); Osloond v. 
Osloond, 609 N.W.2d 118, 122 (S.D. 2000); Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987); Olen v. Phelps, 546 N.W.2d 176, 180–81 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996); Kaycee Land & Livestock v. 
Flahive, 46 P.3d 323, 325 (Wyo. 2002); Elizabeth E. Brown, A Guide to Winning Alter Ego Claims, 
AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 1996, at 15, 15 (“Although they may combine or state them differently, 
most courts utilize . . . 12 factors . . . .”); Matheson & Eby, supra note 8, at 173 (“The failure of the 
courts’ previous attempts to articulate a single test for disregarding the corporate form and holding 
the owners of the corporation responsible for the business’s financial responsibilities has resulted in 
a number of overlapping lists of factors that are passed off as tests.”). 
 29. The California Court of Appeals attempted to create an exhaustive list of factors used by 
courts in Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 813–15 (Ct. App. 1962).  
There, the court provided the following as a list of factors used by courts to justify their piercing 
decisions: 
[1] Commingling of funds and other assets, failure to segregate funds of the separate 
entities, and the unauthorized diversion of corporate funds or assets to other than 
corporate uses; [2] the treatment by an individual of the assets of the corporation as his 
own; [3] the failure to obtain authority to issue stock or to subscribe to or issue the same; 
[4] the holding out by an individual that he is personally liable for the debts of the 
corporation; [5] the failure to maintain minutes or adequate corporate records, and the 
confusion of the records of the separate entities; [6] the identical equitable ownership in 
the two entities; [7] the identification of the equitable owners thereof with the domination 
and control of the two entities; [8] identification of the directors and officers of the two 
entities in the responsible supervision and management; [9] sole ownership of all of the 
stock in a corporation by one individual or the members of a family; [10] the use of the 
same office or business location; [11] the employment of the same employees and/or 
attorney; [12] the failure to adequately capitalize a corporation; [13] the total absence of 
corporate assets, and undercapitalization; [14] the use of a corporation as a mere shell, 
instrumentality or conduit for a single venture or the business of an individual or another 
corporation; [15] the concealment and misrepresentation of the identity of the responsible 
ownership, management and financial interest, or concealment of personal business 
activities; [16] the disregard of legal formalities and the failure to maintain arm’s length 
relationships among related entities; [17] the use of the corporate entity to procure labor, 
services or merchandise for another person or entity; [18] the diversion of assets from a 
corporation by or to a stockholder or other person or entity, to the detriment of creditors, 
or the manipulation of assets and liabilities between entities so as to concentrate the 
assets in one and the liabilities in another; [19] the contracting with another with intent to 
avoid performance by use of a corporate entity as a shield against personal liability, or the 
use of a corporation as a subterfuge of illegal transactions; [20] and the formation and use 
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factually charged, they are largely more reflective of the judge’s personal 
opinion on the instant case as opposed to the judge’s interpretation of the 
general law.30  Thus, in terms of predictability and consistency, the tests 
have become only slightly more sophisticated than the smell test.31 
The lack of a specific test is further exacerbated by the existence of 
multiple types of piercing cases.  That is, in addition to the multifarious 
tests in general, the courts weigh different factors more heavily 
depending on the type of piercing case.32  There are tort versus contract 
cases,33 horizontal versus vertical piercing cases,34 reverse piercing 
cases,35 and triangular piercing cases.36  Each of these, of course, asks the 
judge to focus attention on specific types of factors within the test but 
does not provide any objective means for deciding when piercing would 
be appropriate. 
                                                                                                                       
of a corporation to transfer to it the existing liability of another person or entity. 
Id. (citations omitted).  Nevertheless, courts have used other factors as well.  See Kavanaugh v. Ford 
Motor Co., 353 F.2d 710, 717 (7th Cir. 1965); Millon, supra note 8, at 1327 (“When one attempts to 
rationalize the piercing cases according to some other set of values, one encounters a dismal morass 
of repetitive rhetoric masking conclusory evaluation.  The cases typically list a series of more or less 
standard factors.  Little if anything is said about how they are to be weighted or which ones are 
necessary or sufficient by themselves to support a piercing result.”); Morrissey, supra note 5, at 544 
(“Without a unified criterion for piercing, courts have relied on what one commentator called, ‘a 
number of overlapping lists of factors that are passed off as a test.’” (quoting Matheson & Eby, 
supra note 8, at 173)). 
 30. See Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 514–15; Robert W. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 
TEX. L. REV. 979, 982–83 (1971) (stating the tests used to determine when piercing is appropriate 
are merely artifices used by courts to justify their conclusions); Presser, supra note 4, at 411 (“[T]he 
current state of veil-piercing law is chaotic . . . .”). 
 31. See Huss, supra note 3, at 109 (noting that the principle is “seemingly random” in its 
application). 
 32. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion 
Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REV. 853, 884–87 (1997) 
(stating undercapitalization is only typically deemed important in tort cases). 
 33. Caudill, supra note 23, at 467 (summarizing Judge Posner’s view that horizontal and 
vertical piercing should only be available in fraudulent misrepresentation cases); Gevurtz, supra note 
32, at 884 (stating the difference between contract and tort piercing cases); Morrissey, supra note 5, 
at 545 (noting a distinction between contract and tort cases for purposes of piercing). 
 34. John H. Matheson, The Limits of Business Limited Liability: Entity Veil Piercing and 
Successor Liability Doctrines, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 411, 419–20 (2004) (noting the distinction 
between horizontal and vertical veil piercing cases). 
 35. Caudill, supra note 23, at 467 (“Reverse piercing occurs when a court holds a controlled 
corporation, which has been misused as the alter ego or instrumentality of a shareholder, liable for 
the debts of that controlling shareholder.”). 
 36. Id. at 469 (“Triangular piercing occurs when a controlled corporation is held liable for the 
debts of an affiliated corporation, through an intermediary controlling shareholder.  The liability 
flows in a triangle, first from the controlled corporation to the controlling shareholder, then from the 
controlling shareholder to the affiliated corporation.”). 
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A. Tort Versus Contract Cases 
While the separation between tort and contract theories in ordinary 
litigation can sometimes prove difficult,37 courts have routinely viewed 
the two as finitely distinct in both the application of piercing and its 
theory.38  The separation of tort and contract, as it applies to piercing 
theory, stems from perceived choice of the parties.39  That is, in tort 
cases, the plaintiff does not necessarily choose to engage in a relationship 
with the defendant.40  Rather, in many cases that relationship is thrust 
upon the plaintiff.41  In contrast, contract cases are ordinarily the result of 
two or more bargaining parties who each possess the power to 
investigate one another prospectively before entering the relationship.42  
While this distinction seems somewhat irrelevant in a vacuum, its 
theoretical underpinning makes sense, if nowhere else, when discussing 
the injustice element of the piercing doctrine. 
The injustice element in the piercing doctrine stems from the 
doctrine’s historical roots.  That is, the piercing doctrine evolved as a 
judicial, equitable response to the perceived—or actual—unfairness that 
could result from the application of strict limited liability statutes.43  
Thus, notwithstanding the mandates of limited liability, courts have 
permitted plaintiffs to pierce the corporate veil in circumstances where 
permitting the defendant to hide behind the black letter of the law would 
be unjust—the defendant has engaged in fraud, misrepresentation, or 
undercapitalization.44  In this context, the theoretical notion of choice 
plays a significant role because it defines what level of injustice could 
have existed between the parties and, thus, how rigorously the court will 
enforce the discretion of equity jurisdiction.45  For example, in the 
context of fraud, one party to a contract can investigate another before 
entering the relationship.46  Presumably, a party’s diligent effort would 
uncover any material fraud.  Thus, parties to a contract have some ability 
                                                     
 37. For instance, the fine bifurcation between the two is less clear in quasi-contractual, 
equitable theories such as promissory estoppel because those theories have developed in both tort 
and contract jurisprudence. 
 38. See, e.g., Edwards Co. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., 730 F.2d 977, 982 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 39. See Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 858–59. 
 40. See Millon, supra note 8, at 1355. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 858–59; Millon, supra note 8, at 1315–17, 1355; Thompson, 
supra note 3, at 1039–40. 
 43. West & Cargill, supra note 17, at 1058, 1060. 
 44. See id. at 1060. 
 45. See sources cited supra note 42. 
 46. See Millon, supra note 8, at 1368. 
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to engage in self-help prospectively.47  This theoretically, of course, 
would lead to a less rigorous exercise of equity jurisdiction on the basis 
that the courts will only invoke equity jurisdiction to help those who 
have done everything possible to help themselves.48  In contrast, classic 
tort plaintiffs do not always possess this ability.49  For instance, if a 
plaintiff is injured by a faulty widget produced by the defendant and used 
by a third party, then the plaintiff lacked the ability to investigate for 
undercapitalization, and, thus, the plaintiff’s claim for the exercise of 
equity jurisdiction is presumably better. 
Notwithstanding this seemingly sound theoretical argument, 
empirical studies do not indicate that courts actually apply this model on 
the average.50  Rather, contrary to what one might think, courts most 
frequently pierce in contract cases.51  Nevertheless, the distinction still 
plays some role in which factors a court deems important in a piercing 
analysis.52  For instance, in contract cases, undercapitalization is largely 
ignored,53 while in tort cases, undercapitalization is generally deemed 
important.54  Thus, in terms of application, the distinction between the 
two types of cases tends to focus on the element of injustice. 
B. Horizontal Versus Vertical Piercing Cases 
In contrast with the dichotomy between tort and contract cases—a 
dichotomy that affects all piercing cases—the distinction between 
horizontal and vertical piercing cases only affects a small subclass of 
piercing cases—a plaintiff seeks to pierce through one corporation that 
possesses some relationship with another corporation. 
Horizontal piercing involves a plaintiff’s attempt to pierce the veil of 
one subsidiary to reach the assets of another subsidiary who shares a 
                                                     
 47. Id. 
 48. See 1 CHARLES FISK BEACH, JR., MODERN EQUITY: COMMENTARIES ON MODERN EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE AS DETERMINED BY THE COURTS AND STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND THE UNITED 
STATES § 54, at 53–54 (1892); 27 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 69:34, at 25 (4th ed. 2003) (“Equity will not interfere on behalf of one 
alleging fraud where the person relying on the misrepresentation had an opportunity to prevent any 
injury by due diligence.”); Watt, supra note 18, at 872–73 (“Typically, in contract claims, . . . the 
plaintiff must prove a higher degree of culpability . . . than in a tort case for the court to pierce the 
corporate veil because the plaintiff has sufficient information to make an informed choice . . . before 
entering the transaction.”). 
 49. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 50. Thompson, supra note 3, at 1038. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Presser, supra note 4, at 412. 
 53. See Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 884–87. 
 54. See id. at 887. 
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parent corporation.55  Thus, for example, imagine corporation A, a parent 
corporation, owns shares in three subsidiary corporations, B, C, and D, 
each of whom produce different types of widgets.  A horizontal piercing 
claim would involve a plaintiff attempting to pierce the veil of B to 
attack the assets of C.  If this process were drawn, as in Figure 1, then, 
the plaintiff would literally be attempting to simultaneously attack two 
corporations of equal power within the larger corporate hierarchy—thus, 
the term horizontal. 
Figure 1: Horizontal Piercing 
Parent 
 
Subsidiary                                       Subsidiary 
 
The phrase vertical piercing evolved from the same visual notions.  
Vertical piercing occurs when a plaintiff attempts to pierce through the 
corporate shield of a subsidiary to reach the assets of a parent.56  Thus, in 
the example above, a plaintiff would be attempting to pierce the 
corporate shield of B to reach the assets of A.  In contrast with horizontal 
piercing, the plaintiff is no longer attempting to pierce two corporations 
of equal power within the hierarchy of the corporate structure.  Rather, 
the plaintiff is now attempting to pierce an inferior corporate entity—a 
subsidiary—in an attempt to reach the assets of a superior corporate 
entity—the parent.  If drawn, as in Figure 2, the plaintiff would literally 
draw a piercing line upwards—hence, the name. 






Subsidiary                            Subsidiary 
 
                                                     
 55. Matheson, supra note 34, at 420. 
 56. See Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 898–99. 
MARCANTEL FINAL 11/15/2010  4:15:35 PM 
202 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
In terms of application, courts tend to focus their inquiry on control or 
unity factors when analyzing horizontal and vertical piercing cases and 
deemphasize injustice elements.57 
C. Reverse Piercing Cases 
Reverse piercing cases can occur as an overlay of any of the types of 
piercing cases discussed above, as reverse piercing is an attempt by a 
plaintiff to pierce a shareholder—or, in the case of a multicorporate 
structure, a superior—to reach the assets of an inferior.58  Thus, in the 
common corporate context where there is a single corporate entity and a 
number of shareholders, a reverse pierce would be an attempt by the 
plaintiff to pierce through the shareholder to reach the assets of the 
corporation.59  This is demonstrated in Figure 3. 






Shareholder            Shareholder            Shareholder 
 
Or, in the context of a multicorporate structure, a reverse pierce would 
occur where a plaintiff attempts to pierce a parent to reach the assets of a 
subsidiary.60  This is demonstrated in Figure 4. 
                                                     
 57. Id. 
 58. See Caudill, supra note 23, at 467. 
 59. Id. at 467–68. 
 60. Id. at 467. 
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Subsidiary                           Subsidiary 
 
In terms of application, as with horizontal and vertical piercing 
cases, courts tend to emphasize the control and unity elements and 
deemphasize the injustice elements.  In addition, some have argued this 
type of piercing should only be available in contractual misrepresentation 
cases.61 
D. Triangular Piercing Cases 
Triangular piercing cases are the most complicated of the piercing 
structures, as they potentially entail all of the hallmarks of the above 
structures with a twist—triangular piercing cases can arise from tort or 
contract cases, have elements of horizontal and vertical structures, and 
involve reverse piercing.62  Triangular piercing cases exist where a 
plaintiff attempts to pierce a parent corporation to reach a shareholder of 
the parent, in an attempt to reach an otherwise unrelated corporation of 
which the shareholder owns an interest.63  Thus, imagine a parent 
company, A, is solely owned by a shareholder, B.  Furthermore, imagine 
that B owns shares in an unrelated corporation, C.  Now imagine that 
while the plaintiff has only dealt with A and B, the plaintiff has had no 
direct relationship with C.  Nevertheless, both A and B are insolvent.  
Thus, the plaintiff seeks to pierce A to reach B to reach C, as Figure 5 
demonstrates.  This, of course, forms a triangle, giving rise to the name. 
                                                     
 61. Id. at 470–72 (summarizing Judge Posner’s views on reverse piercing). 
 62. See id. at 469–70. 
 63. Id. at 469. 
MARCANTEL FINAL 11/15/2010  4:15:35 PM 
204 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
Figure 5: Triangular Piercing 







In terms of application, as with horizontal, vertical, and reverse 
piercing cases, courts tend to emphasize the control and unity elements 
and deemphasize the injustice elements.64  In addition, some have argued 
this type of piercing should only be available in contractual 
misrepresentation cases.65 
III. PREDICTABILITY AND CONSISTENCY AS GOALS OF MODERN 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The concepts of predictability and consistency are said to have first 
arisen on a mandatory basis, at least in England, in the Magna Carta.66  
While the Magna Carta was designed to limit the power of the king, as 
opposed to the powers of democratic governments, its ideals of 
nonarbitrary government action have nonetheless formed the essential 
basis of our modern democratic system67 and have worked their way into 
some of the most prominent documents in the United States.68  While 
predictability and consistency have certainly formed the basis for larger 
discussions about all of our governmental branches,69 these twin goals 
                                                     
 64. See id. at 464–67. 
 65. Id. at 470–72 (summarizing Judge Posner’s views on triangular piercing). 
 66. See Christine N. Cimini, Principles of Non-Arbitrariness: Lawlessness in the 
Administration of Welfare, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 451, 459 (2005) (“Historically, concepts of non-
arbitrariness extend back to the Magna Carta, and a general repudiation of governmental 
arbitrariness is evidenced in many documents that form the foundation of our current legal system.”). 
 67. See id. 
 68. See Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 
1310 (2003) (stating that portions of the Magna Carta exist in at least forty state constitutions). 
 69. See John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 
516 (2000) (noting adherence to judicial precedent is sound policy because it promotes 
evenhandedness, predictability, consistency, and reliance); Julia Shear Kushner, Comment, The 
Right to Control One’s Name, 57 UCLA L. REV. 313, 358–59 (2009) (noting a statute with fewer 
guidelines for a court to consider would lead to less predictability and consistency and more 
litigation); David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of Profits, 
and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, and 
 
MARCANTEL FINAL 11/15/2010  4:15:35 PM 
2011] LIMITING JUDICIAL DISCRETION 205 
are most pressing in the context of judicial decisions and have assisted 
the reasoning of nearly every appellate court in the country.70  Most 
notably, they are the key goals embedded within the doctrine of stare 
decisis.71 
While many civilizations have recognized the prudence of reviewing 
historical judicial decisions as a means to understand current litigation,72 
stare decisis—or “stand by the thing decided and do not disturb the 
calm”73—ultimately originated in its present form in England.74  The  
 
                                                                                                                       
Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 502–03 (2009) (noting the FCPA’s regulatory scheme owes 
some level of predictability and consistency to parties that it seeks to regulate). 
 70. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (stating the 
doctrine of stare decisis is indispensable to the rule of law); Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 
U.S. 261, 272 (1980) (holding stare decisis plays “an important role in orderly adjudication . . . [and] 
serves the broader societal interests in evenhanded, consistent, and predictable application of legal 
rules.”); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970); Keck v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 
830 So. 2d 1, 7–8 (Ala. 2002); Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency Formation Comm’n, 981 
P.2d 543, 552 (Cal. 1999); Conway v. Town of Wilton, 680 A.2d 242, 246 (Conn. 1996); Keeler v. 
Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 672 A.2d 1012, 1017 (Del. 1996); Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Gates, 
171 S.E.2d 723, 734 (Ga. 1969); Roberts v. Krupka, 779 P.2d 447, 456 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); Irish 
v. Gimbel, 743 A.2d 736, 737 (Me. 2000); Livesay v. Baltimore Cnty., 862 A.2d 33, 40–41 (Md. 
2004); Stonehill Coll. v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 808 N.E.2d 205, 216 (Mass. 2004); 
State v. Manford, 106 N.W. 907, 908 (Minn. 1906); Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205, 208 (N.H. 1966); 
Arrow Builders Supply Corp. v. Hudson Terrace Apartments, Inc., 105 A.2d 387, 391 (N.J. 1954); 
People v. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969, 978 (N.Y. 2007); Bacon v. Lee, 549 S.E.2d 840, 851–52 (N.C. 
2001); Stilp v. Commonwealth, 905 A.2d 918, 954 (Pa. 2006); State v. Musumeci, 717 A.2d 56, 68 
(R.I. 1998); Union Trust Co. v. Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 500 S.W.2d 608, 615 
(Tenn. 1973); State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 291–92 (Utah 1995); see also THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 80, supra note 1, at 401 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The mere necessity of uniformity in the 
interpretation of the national laws, decides the question.  Thirteen independent courts of final 
jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government, from which 
nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed.”). 
 71. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 272 (stating that stare decisis plays “an important role in orderly 
adjudication . . . [and] serves the broader societal interests in evenhanded, consistent, and predictable 
application of legal rules”). 
 72. See Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43, 
54–55 (2001) (“In ancient Greece, judges relied on past cases to settle commercial disputes, while 
early Egyptian judges prepared a rudimentary system of law reports to help them guide their 
decisions.  Roman judges also displayed a tendency to follow the example of their predecessors.”). 
 73. Mark Sabel, The Role of Stare Decisis in Construing the Alabama Constitution of 1901, 53 
ALA. L. REV. 273, 274 (2001); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Toward Neutral Principles of Stare Decisis 
in Tort Law, 58 S.C. L. REV. 317, 320 (2006); James C. Rehnquist, Note, The Power That Shall Be 
Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345, 
347 (1986); see also Luis Diego Canseco & Enrique Pasquel, Stare Decisis, Commercial Exchanges, 
and Predictability: A Proposal to Confront the Reform of the Judicial Branch, 20 FLA. J. INT’L L. 
S31, 49 (2008) (stating stare decisis literally means to “keep to the determined decision and maintain 
the calm”). 
 74. For a thorough examination of the doctrine’s evolution in England, see Healy, supra note 
72, at 54–72.  See also Canseco & Pasquel, supra note 73, at 49–50 (stating stare decisis originated 
in Rome but developed in its present form in Great Britain). 
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doctrine was then transferred to the United States both through the 
colonial governments75 and the understanding of our founding fathers.76 
Predictability and consistency in judicial judgments are important for 
obvious reasons.  They promote public confidence in the law;77 foster 
certainty;78 enhance stability in the law;79 create efficiency;80 promote 
unbiased, meritorious decisions;81 and encourage judicial restraint.82  
However, they are particularly important in the context of business law, 
as business transactions inherently presume continuity in the law as it 
exists today.83  Thus, predictability and consistency in this realm 
encourages citizens to conduct business, leading to a more viable 
economy.84  Inversely, unpredictability and inconsistency discourage 
business by generating a lack of reliance.  Notwithstanding this obvious 
truth, these integral twin principles do not exist in the piercing doctrine.85  
Instead, as stated earlier, the piercing doctrine operates in a factually  
 
                                                     
 75. Healy, supra note 72, at 75; Rehnquist, supra note 73, at 348. 
 76. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 397 (Alexander Hamilton) (“To avoid an 
arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules 
and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes 
before them . . . .”); Jordan Wilder Connors, Note, Treating Like Subdecisions Alike: The Scope of 
Stare Decisis as Applied to Judicial Methodology, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 681, 685 (2008) (“Although 
the Constitution contains no reference to stare decisis, ample evidence suggests that the Framers and 
commentators at the time of ratification contemplated its application and supported some manner of 
its use.”). 
 77. Sabel, supra note 73, at 274; Schwartz et al., supra note 73, at 320; Connors, supra note 76, 
at 687; Kelly Parker, Comment, Of Sleeping Dogs and Silent Love: Stare Decisis and Lawrence v. 
Texas, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 177, 188 (2004); Rehnquist, supra note 73, at 347. 
 78. Canseco & Pasquel, supra note 73, at 49; Healy, supra note 72, at 51; Christopher J. Peters, 
Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2039 
(1996). 
 79. Canseco & Pasquel, supra note 73, at 49; Healy, supra note 72, at 70; Peters, supra note 78, 
at 2039; Sabel, supra note 73, at 274. 
 80. Healy, supra note 72, at 108–09; Parker, supra note 77, at 188; Peters, supra note 78, at 
2039; Sabel, supra note 73, at 274; Connors, supra note 76, at 685; Parisis G. Filippatos, Note, The 
Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Protection of Civil Rights and Liberties in the Rehnquist Court, 11 
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 335, 338 (1991). 
 81. See Healy, supra note 72, at 109; Sabel, supra note 73, at 274; see also Connors, supra note 
76, at 687 (stating stare decisis promoted fairness); Filippatos, supra note 80, at 339 (same). 
 82. Healy, supra note 72, at 109. 
 83. Peters, supra note 78, at 2039; Rehnquist, supra note 73, at 348; see also Miller, supra note 
4, at 112 (“The degree of judicial discretion surrounding the law of entity recognition poses a 
distinct challenge to the business planner in search of predictability in the law.”). 
 84. Healy, supra note 72, at 108; Parker, supra note 77, at 188 (“‘Stare decisis provides some 
moorings so that men may trade and arrange their affairs with confidence.  Stare decisis serves to 
take the capricious element out of the law and give stability to a society.  It is a strong tie which the 
future has to the past.’” (quoting William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 
(1949))). 
 85. Huss, supra note 3, at 110 (noting the principle is arbitrary in its application). 
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intensive vacuum that is wholly removed from traditional notions of stare 
decisis.86 
The crux of the problem has been, then, to create a system that 
preserves the fundamental notions of fairness entangled within the 
piercing doctrine, while attempting to achieve some level of 
predictability and consistency with its application.  That problem has 
proven a tough beast to slay because the current piercing formulations 
provide an extraordinary degree of discretion to the judiciary.  
Nevertheless, a number of scholars have proposed a variety of 
mechanisms to alleviate the predictability and consistency problem. 
IV. PROPOSALS BY OTHER SCHOLARS 
A number of proposals already exist to remedy the predictability and 
consistency problems the doctrine currently generates.  Generally, two 
types of theories exist, each respectively focusing on either abolishing 
the doctrine altogether or alleviating the doctrine’s more inhospitable 
characteristics through codification of a more stringent test.  All of these 
proposals suffer from deficiencies. 
A. Proposals Advocating Elimination of the Doctrine 
The first category of proposals attempts to eliminate the piercing 
doctrine.  Three prominent theories exist for elimination of the doctrine: 
(1) the Bainbridge Proposal,87 (2) the Mandatory Insurance Proposal, and 
(3) the Mandatory Capitalization Proposal.88 
1. The Bainbridge Proposal 
Professor Bainbridge has been an outspoken critic of the piercing 
doctrine and has explicitly advocated its abolition for two reasons.  First, 
he posits that the doctrine is unprincipled and uncontrollable.89  Second, 
he argues the doctrine has predictability costs without serving any policy 
goals.90 
                                                     
 86. Id. 
 87. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 7 (outlining the proposal). 
 88. While the Mandatory Insurance and Mandatory Capitalization proposals do not explicitly 
recommend abolition of the doctrine, the proposals are, by their very nature, a replacement for the 
doctrine.  Thus, the doctrine’s abolition is implicit. 
 89. Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 481. 
 90. Id. 
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As to the first reason, Professor Bainbridge argues fairly simply, and 
correctly, that veil piercing lacks any objective criteria capable of 
prospective analysis or application.91  Rather, veil-piercing tests are 
composed of a variety of factors that a court, retrospectively, will review 
to determine whether piercing is appropriate.92  This obviously leads to 
uncertainty and unpredictability from a corporate planning perspective.93  
Exacerbating the problem, Professor Bainbridge argues, courts 
frequently seize on one aspect of the factors test and consider it 
dispositive, even when that aspect, standing alone, is simply a common 
virtue of even legitimate corporations.94 
As to the second reason, Professor Bainbridge argues that this 
unpredictability has social costs without any social benefit.95  The social 
costs, of course, are inconsistency, unpredictability, the potential for 
overcapitalization and, thus, reduction in liquidity, difficulty in advising 
clients prospectively, difficulty in planning from the client’s perspective, 
and general undermining of limited liability.96  In terms of social 
benefits, Professor Bainbridge does not believe veil piercing serves 
any.97  Rather, because its application is unprincipled, he believes it 
could not serve any of the social benefits typically discussed as the 
policy basis supporting its existence—serving as a valve release for 
excessive externalization.98  Furthermore, Professor Bainbridge argues 
the injustice purportedly prevented by the piercing doctrine is actually 
equally preventable using existing causes of action—misrepresentation, 
fraud, and fraudulent transfer.99 
For the most part, Professor Bainbridge is correct—current veil-
piercing jurisprudence is extremely unprincipled and wildly 
unpredictable.  Furthermore, existing causes of action can serve the 
majority of the doctrine’s effects and policy goals.  Nevertheless, 
eliminating veil piercing has costs to the legitimate policy goals.  
Furthermore, while existing causes of action are sufficient to serve most 
areas of potential abuse, existing causes of action are nonetheless 
insufficient in the context of undercapitalization.100 
                                                     
 91. Id. at 513. 
 92. Id. at 510. 
 93. See id. at 481. 
 94. See id. at 511–13. 
 95. Id. at 524. 
 96. Id. at 481. 
 97. Id. at 481, 524. 
 98. Id. at 535. 
 99. Id. at 516, 521–22. 
 100. See Millon, supra note 8, at 1358–59 (“Actions for misrepresentation and fraudulent 
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First and foremost, piercing serves a deterrent goal.  Second, piercing 
serves as a valve release for the extreme inequitable aspects of limited 
liability.  As to the first, while the estimation is not easily susceptible to 
concrete proof, the intuitive notion seems unequivocal.  The potential of 
piercing causes shareholders to act differently than they would if piercing 
did not exist.101  Thus, for example, shareholders less frequently 
undercapitalize than they otherwise would for fear of exposure to 
piercing.  Or shareholders of close corporations have greater incentives 
to watch each other to prevent fraud.  Of course, one could argue, 
somewhat in line with Professor Bainbridge’s second argument,102 that 
these causes of action already exist in one form or another, and, thus, 
piercing is simply duplicative.  In terms of deterrence, however, piercing 
still serves an independent goal.  The fear of exposing one’s personal 
assets to a judgment in part serves an overdeterrence goal analogous to 
that of punitive damages—it not only removes the financial incentives, 
creating a “break even” scenario, it also provides exposure over and 
above what the corporation might have actually sustained, making 
inequitable conduct a poor business decision.103 
For example, imagine a corporation, A, is owned by shareholders B, 
C, and D.  Imagine further that B engages in fraud against E, and E later 
sues, seeking to pierce.  While E could certainly sue A and B for fraud 
even absent piercing, E’s recovery would be limited to funds available 
from A and B.  With the addition of piercing, however, C and D are now 
potentially personally liable as well, creating an incentive to “watch the 
store” and prevent such activity. 
Or imagine a circumstance where a corporation is constantly 
undercapitalized and is subsequently sued.  While fraudulent transfer 
laws certainly permit “reach backs” for previous transfers, they only 
permit a plaintiff to access funds that were in fact fraudulently 
transferred.  Thus, financial incentives could still exist for a corporation 
to undercapitalize because, even if successful, a plaintiff would only 
                                                                                                                       
conveyance would not, however, reach all of the cases in which shareholders have used limited 
liability in ways that offend public policy.  As argued above, shareholders who cause the corporation 
to incur debt while knowing that repayment is impossible or highly unlikely arguably should be 
treated differently from those whose corporations default despite their good faith efforts to manage 
the business in a financially responsible manner.”). 
 101. See Presser, supra note 4, at 412 (“‘[T]he very vagueness and uncertainty of the piercing 
doctrine encourages adequate capitalization (and the purchase of liability insurance) by 
corporations . . . .’” (quoting ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 355 
(8th ed. 2003))). 
 102. See supra notes 95–99 and accompanying text. 
 103. Cf. Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating overdeterrence is a goal of 
punitive damages because it eliminates what could otherwise be a positive cost-benefit analysis). 
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recover the amounts of the transfers.  Additionally, given the likelihood 
of the plaintiff’s failure and the likelihood of never being sued, 
undercapitalizing could still make good fiscal sense in a cost-benefit 
analysis.  That perspective, however, is at least less true when 
shareholders are faced with the possibility of personal liability exceeding 
that which the corporation could have ever been solvent to pay in the 
first place.  Once overdeterrence enters the cost-benefit analysis, it could 
not only remove the financial incentives, it could cause the pendulum to 
shift in the other direction.  Finally, although piercing is rare and 
currently unprincipled,104 its rarity still likely bears some deterrent effect 
for people quite simply act differently when no risk exists than when 
some risk exists.  More importantly, the deterrent effect could be 
enhanced through making application of the piercing doctrine more 
predictable.  In other words, courts should not throw the baby out with 
the bathwater.  Rather, they should just get new water. 
Furthermore, in part responding to Professor Bainbridge’s first 
reason and in part responding to his second reason, piercing does serve 
as a valve release in circumstances where existing causes of action would 
not.  For instance, imagine a corporation “accidentally” grossly 
undercapitalizes such that the corporation is not within the reach of 
fraudulent transfer laws.105  Imagine further there is no classic siphoning, 
and the only equitable basis for seeking funds outside the corporate 
assets is premised on the corporation’s failure to properly capitalize—
there is no basis for a cause of action for misrepresentation, fraud, and so 
on.  This is one of many circumstances piercing was intended to prevent.  
That is, piercing is intended to mitigate some of the more extreme 
aspects of limited liability and serve as a mechanism for plaintiffs to 
achieve a remedy where a corporation has failed to act legitimately.106  
While academics and courts can certainly disagree on when it is 
appropriate to pierce, it is difficult for anyone to admit there are not at 
least some circumstances wherein piercing should be permitted. 
                                                     
 104. Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 481, 513–14. 
 105. This circumstance can happen more easily than one might think.  See Nina A. Mendelson, A 
Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 
1269 (2002) (“Until a corporation has actual knowledge that a specific lawsuit is threatened or 
pending, a plaintiff will have difficult time showing that the transfer was made with knowledge that 
a lawsuit has been filed or threatened, and hence ‘with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any 
creditor.’” (quoting UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 301–02 (1999))). 
 106. See, e.g., Ballantine, supra note 19, at 19 (stating the test is whether the corporation used 
the corporation in good faith for legitimate ends); Presser, supra note 4, at 407 (“It is, or at least once 
was and ought again to be, hornbook law that a shareholder or a parent corporation should not lose 
the protection of limited liability unless that shareholder or parent has somehow ‘abused’ the 
corporate form.”). 
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In the final analysis, the piercing doctrine, as currently conceived 
and applied, is unpredictable, inconsistent, and at least lackluster at 
achieving its stated goals.  However, a better test would achieve better 
results. 
2. The Mandatory Insurance Proposal 
While adherents to the mandatory insurance proposals have not 
specifically noted that elimination of the doctrine is a goal,107 the concept 
behind the proposal is in the nature of a replacement—a mechanism 
designed to eliminate the need for piercing doctrine altogether, using 
insurance as a vehicle. 
The concept behind the mandatory insurance argument is that a 
corporation, as a matter of legislative requirement, should always carry 
“sufficient” insurance.108  While this remedy certainly could create more 
predictability and consistency than existing piercing doctrine, at least as 
far as the theories have come, there does not appear to be any objective 
link that a corporation could use to “know” how much insurance to have.  
Nevertheless, the corporation would presumably need to discern the 
nature of its activities, the foreseeable—and sometimes less 
foreseeable—potential harms of its activities, the potential damage 
amounts for those activities, and other possible considerations.  Again, at 
least as far as the theories have come, the corporation seemingly would 
need to know these things in a vacuum—untethered to any objective 
criteria or external information to assist with the decision-making 
process.  Additionally, to the extent the mandate arose as a specific 
number or calculus promulgated by a legislative body, such a theory 
would require a legislative body to account for the various types of 
existing industries, the various types of potential industries, the potential 
harms those industries could create, and the types of damages those 
harms could create.109  Needless to say, this is a tall order that would 
come with substantial prospective costs. 
                                                     
 107. See Huss, supra note 3, at 129–32; Gregory W. Wix, Comment, Piercing the Corporate 
Veil: Should Michigan Consider Statutory Solutions?, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 637, 654–56 
(2002) (reviewing the proposals of other scholars). 
 108. Huss, supra note 3, at 129–30; Wix, supra note 107, at 654–56 (reviewing proposals by 
other scholars). 
 109. See Huss, supra note 3, at 131. 
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Assuming this could be achieved through actuarial models,110 
mandatory insurance nonetheless would encourage risky behavior.111  
This premise again needs no proof to sustain it because its intuitive roots 
are so strikingly clear.  Insurance, in the first instance, is intended to 
create a sense of safety in the insured.112  That safety derives from the 
notion that the insured has engaged in risk-sharing with the insurance 
company.113  In the case of the insured’s risk, the ultimate payment is 
made prospectively through a premium; thus, the insured’s risk is 
disgorged each month.  That, of course, is not true of the insurance 
company.  This creates a situation where, at any given moment, the risk 
as to both parties is asymmetrical, even if the risk is ultimately evenly 
shared over time. 
In the context of a piercing case, shareholders who are most likely to 
get pierced are those who play “fast and loose” with their corporate 
structure under the presumable notion that getting pierced is statistically 
unlikely.  If insurance were mandatory, those individuals would be 
further emboldened to engage in even riskier behavior, as their risk of 
loss would be substantially less and they would have already paid for the 
privilege of the gamble.  While this option would certainly serve to 
protect would-be plaintiffs from insolvent corporations, it would simply 
force some corporations to shoulder the burden for others—those 
corporations who do nothing wrong and are not the target of mandatory 
insurance would pay enhanced premiums for insurance they do not need 
to pay as a result of those who game the system by engaging in risky 
conduct.  From a public policy perspective, this result is undesirable. 
                                                     
 110. “Actuarial methods are classical risk management techniques” that use mathematical 
equations to determine appropriate premiums for insurance policies.  See Stephen A. Kane, 
Identifying and Assessing Adverse Selection, 3 J. BUS. & ECON. RES., Mar. 2005, at 9, 15. 
 111. See Richard Lempert, Low Probability/High Consequence Events: Dilemmas of Damage 
Compensation, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 385 (2009); see also George L. Priest, Insurability and 
Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1025 (1989) (“An act for which the occurrence is subject 
to the volition of the insured is highly susceptible to insurance incentives: the existence of insurance 
directly reduces the costs of such acts and makes them uninsurable.”). 
 112. See Jeffery W. Stempel, Domtar Baby: Misplaced Notions of Equitable Apportionment 
Create a Thicket of Potential Unfairness for Insurance Policyholders, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
769, 896 (1999) (“Insurance is usually described as one party’s agreement to suffer a certain but 
relatively small loss (i.e., the premium payment) in return for obtaining the insurer’s agreement to 
cover the possibility of contingent but larger losses.”). 
 113. Id. 
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3. The Mandatory Capitalization Proposal 
The concept behind mandatory capitalization is somewhat similar to 
the underlying notion behind mandatory insurance, with one exception: 
the origin of the fund maintained for would-be plaintiffs.114  As explained 
above, in the context of mandatory insurance, the fund is derived from 
insurance.  In the context of mandatory capitalization, however, the 
funds derive from the corporation itself.115  The fund is then kept as 
retained earnings available in the event of liability.116 
In many ways, mandatory capitalization theories suffer from the 
same types of criticisms seen in mandatory insurance schemes.117  Thus, 
a legislative body, to determine the appropriate amount, would need to 
account for the various types of existing industries, the various types of 
potential industries, the potential harms those industries could create, and 
the types of damages those harms could create, among other 
considerations.118  At least as far as the theories have come, these 
decisions would be made presumably using traditional mechanisms like 
actuarial models.  As stated earlier, the costs for such an activity would 
be great.119 
Admittedly, my test uses latent elements of mandatory capitalization.  
But, instead of using traditional actuarial models, which have substantial 
prospective costs, my test uses the doctrine of custom, described in more 
detail in the next Part.  In addition, my test includes other elements of a 
conjunctive test—elements that would not substantially alter existing 
piercing doctrine while substantially making the test more objective. 
B. Codification Requiring Fraud or Siphoning and Insolvency 
The second category of proposals attempts to create predictability 
and consistency through the creation of a conjunctive test.  By far, the 
                                                     
 114. See Huss, supra note 3, at 129; Wix, supra note 107, at 653–56 (reviewing the proposals of 
other scholars). 
 115. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 115. 
 116. See id. at 114. 
 117. See Huss, supra note 3, at 130–31. 
 118. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 119. Mandatory capitalization schemes exist in some isolated industries.  For instance, the 
banking industry has capitalization requirements mandated by legislation.  See generally Joseph Jude 
Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: A Legitimate Regulatory Concern for Prudential Supervision 
of Banking Activities?, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1299, 1316–36 (1989) (discussing the history of capital 
adequacy regulations in the banking industry).  However, those requirements are for a singular 
industry.  Proponents of mandatory capitalization advocate extending those mechanisms to every 
industry, a much more daunting task. 
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most prominent of these proposals is the Matheson and Eby Proposal. 120  
The crux of the Matheson and Eby Proposal is that the piercing doctrine 
should be refashioned to require a demonstration of two elements.121  
First, Matheson and Eby argue that plaintiffs should be required to 
demonstrate fraud or siphoning.122  Second, Matheson and Eby argue 
plaintiffs should be required to demonstrate insolvency.123 
On the positive side, this proposal is moving in the proper direction.  
That is, instead of attempting to eliminate the doctrine altogether, the 
proposal seeks to limit judicial discretion through the vehicle of a 
conjunctive test.  Nevertheless, the proposal falls short in two respects.  
First, the proposal requires the existence of either fraud or siphoning to 
the exclusion of undercapitalization.  As discussed below in Part V, 
undercapitalization is a necessary option for piercing if the judicial 
system is to preserve the purpose of piercing doctrine—prevention of 
injustice.  Second, the proposal lacks a unity element in its 
codification.124  While the unity element has been widely criticized as 
markedly unrelated to any equitable basis for piercing, the unity 
requirement ensures that not every shareholder could be personally liable 
for the corporate debts.  Rather, only those shareholders who are truly 
controlling the corporation and using it improperly would be subject to 
that type of liability.  Imagine for example that corporation A has two 
shareholders, B and C.  Imagine that C is a completely passive 
shareholder who takes no interest in the day-to-day operations of A.  
Imagine further that B completely controls A and uses A as an alter ego, 
instrumentality, or any other creative metaphor.  If a plaintiff sued A and 
successfully pierced, both B and C would have potential exposure 
because without the unity requirement, every shareholder of a 
corporation, however passive, would be exposed to piercing.  In this 
circumstance, piercing doctrine would create more inequity than it was 
                                                     
 120. Matheson & Eby, supra note 8, at 181–93. 
 121. Id. at 184. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.  As discussed in Part IV, the insolvency requirement is a concept inherent in the doctrine 
itself.  Thus, properly viewed, Matheson and Eby’s proposal simply argues that the doctrine should 
be applied when and only when a demonstration of fraud or siphoning exists.  The proposal does not 
contemplate any other necessary conduct for application of the doctrine. 
 124. The proposed statute includes a comment indicating passive owners are not personally 
liable.  Id. at 186.  Nevertheless, given the proposed statute’s language, passive owners who receive 
insolvency distributions could be exposed to a piercing claim, assuming the passive owners “knew 
that the Limited Liability Entity was insolvent or should have reasonably foreseen that the 
Insolvency Distribution would render Insolvent the Limited Liability Entity . . . .”  Id.  Given that 
any shareholder has knowledge, either constructive or actual, of the corporation’s finances, this 
portion of the proposed statute effectively eliminates the unity requirement. 
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designed to remedy.  Furthermore, it would discourage passive 
investment. 
Thus, while the Matheson & Eby Proposal certainly creates more 
predictability and consistency in the application of the piercing doctrine, 
it does so at the expense of the doctrine itself—it compromises the 
doctrine’s ability to achieve the purpose of preventing injustice. 
V. A PROPOSAL 
While the twin goals of predictability and consistency are important, 
or should be, to the proper administration of the law, most academics and 
judges would agree that both must be sacrificed in those rare instances 
where those goals are in direct conflict with the goal of justice.  While 
the piercing doctrine has certainly been viewed in that light for the 
course of its existence, the doctrine need not remain so unanchored to 
both achieve its goal of justice and provide predictability and 
consistency. 
It is with this context that a new test, if adopted, would mitigate the 
problems of unpredictability and inconsistency generated by the 
overabundance of judicial discretion in the piercing doctrine.  The 
piercing doctrine should become a static, conjunctive test that requires 
the following: (1) an injustice requirement that can be achieved through a 
showing of fraud, misrepresentation, or undercapitalization; (2) a unity 
requirement; (3) a causation requirement; and (4) an insolvency 
requirement. 
A. Piercing Should Require Evidence of Injustice 
While some courts certainly require the existence of some injustice 
element before piercing, many do not.125  Further, even among those that 
require an element of injustice, few courts specifically and explicitly 
require that a plaintiff demonstrate specific types of injustice.126  Instead, 
courts have produced an incredibly broad definition of injustice that 
requires nothing even remotely close to an actual standard.127  In some 
instances, this broad definitional structure has permitted courts to pierce 
                                                     
 125. See Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 865 (“[R]ecent opinions state that meeting the impermissible 
domination and control element can, in itself, justify piercing.”). 
 126. See Presser, supra note 4, at 412 (“It is usually understood that to pierce the corporate veil 
some sort of abuse is required, but there is no consensus on what constitutes ‘abuse.’”). 
 127. See id. at 412–13. 
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upon a simple showing of unity and insolvency.128  In other cases, some 
type of fraud is required.129  Thus, in effect, this broad inquiry creates 
both external inconsistency—or inconsistency between different 
jurisdictions—and internal inconsistency—or inconsistency between 
various decisions within the same jurisdiction. 
Noting this background, the piercing doctrine should require a 
demonstration of fraud,130 misrepresentation,131 or undercapitalization.132  
This solves three problems.  First, a static injustice requirement ensures 
that the shareholder or entity is in fact engaging in behavior that piercing 
should attempt to prevent—the use of limited liability as an absolute 
shield for injustice.133  Thus, in addition to creating external consistency, 
it creates consistency with the goals of the doctrine.  Second, and further 
elaborating on the goal of the doctrine, the introduction of an actual harm 
requirement will prevent piercing on the mere basis that unity and 
insolvency exist.  Finally, creating set, stable types of injustice will 
encourage both internal and external consistency because it will prevent 
individual judges from simply checking their guts to see if something 
unjust has occurred. 
In terms of predictability and consistency, the first two of these 
injustice tests—fraud134 and misrepresentation135—are fairly simple; they 
                                                     
 128. See Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 865 (“[R]ecent opinions state that meeting the impermissible 
domination and control element can, in itself, justify piercing.”); Susan A. Kraemer, Tenth Circuit 
Survey: Corporate Law, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 729, 734 n.32 (1999) (“[S]ome jurisdictions require 
fraud or inequitable result, while other jurisdictions will disregard the corporate entity based only on 
a finding of excessive unity of interest alone.”).  While unity is certainly an important element to a 
piercing claim, its sufficiency to pierce absent harm makes little sense, as there is no doubting that 
close corporations will nearly always meet the test.  Furthermore, as I will discuss later, insolvency 
is a necessary precondition to piercing in the first instance.  Thus, in terms of discerning whether a 
corporation should be pierced, it adds little to the analysis. 
 129. Joseph E. Casson & Julia McMillen, Protecting Nursing Home Companies: Limiting 
Liability Through Corporate Restructuring, 36 J. HEALTH L. 577, 592 (2003). 
 130. This element incorporates a portion of both the Bainbridge and Matheson & Eby 
approaches.  See Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 517; Matheson & Eby, supra note 8, at 184. 
 131. This element incorporates a portion of the Bainbridge approach.  See Bainbridge, supra 
note 7, at 517. 
 132. While Professor Bainbridge certainly discussed the potential of undercapitalization serving 
as a basis of liability in the context of siphoning cases, this proposal views siphoning as a separate 
mechanism for piercing and extends the notion of undercapitalization much more broadly than 
Professor Bainbridge envisioned it.  See id. at 519–20. 
 133. See Campbell, supra note 14, at 36 (“‘What the formula comes down to, once shorn of 
verbiage about control, instrumentality, agency and corporate entity, is that the liability is imposed to 
reach an equitable result.’” (quoting ELVIN R. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED 
CORPORATIONS: A STUDY IN STOCKHOLDER’S LIABILITY 191 (1936))). 
 134. 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 475 (2005) (“To establish a prima facie fraud claim, the 
plaintiff must prove the following elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) false 
representation or concealment of a material fact; (2) reasonably calculated to deceive; (3) made with 
the intent to deceive; (4) resulting in injury or detrimental reliance.”). 
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rely on definitions already jurisprudentially well-worn.  That is, fraud 
and misrepresentation are already fairly static concepts both within 
jurisdictions and between jurisdictions.  Accordingly, rather than try to 
revamp those systems, which seem to be working well, courts should 
incorporate these traditional definitions into the piercing test in their 
existing forms.136 
The final option in the test, however, is not as easily defined.  The 
element of undercapitalization has proven to be one of the more difficult 
problems in the existing piercing doctrine, at least in terms of 
predictability and consistency.  This truth is largely a result of the fact 
that few people could readily discern what it means to be 
undercapitalized from a corporate perspective. 
1. Why Undercapitalization Is Important 
A number of scholars have questioned, implicitly or explicitly, the 
prudence of continuing to permit piercing on the basis of 
undercapitalization without a showing of further injustice.137  This 
largely stems from the notion that limited liability is, in the first instance, 
a means to shelter financial resources, and undercapitalization is simply a 
tool to further that goal.138  Furthermore, capitalization, through retained 
earnings, limits financial resources and liquidity of the entity.139  Finally, 
concerns have perennially existed over what moment in time would serve 
as the basis for undercapitalization140 and what mechanism would be 
                                                                                                                       
 135. Generally, the elements of fraud and misrepresentation are similar.  See 37 C.J.S. Fraud  
§ 77 (2008) (“The difference between intentional or fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent 
misrepresentation is that the latter only requires that the statement or omission was made without a 
reasonable basis for believing its truthfulness, rather than an actual knowledge of its falsity.”). 
 136. This is somewhat of a change, as courts do not typically apply these tests stringently in 
piercing cases.  See 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 57 (2004) (“Under the particular circumstances 
of the case, a showing of moral culpability, in addition to other factors, is often necessary to justify 
disregarding a corporate entity, although it has been said that proof of plain fraud is not a necessary 
element in a finding to disregard the corporate entity.”). 
 137. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 521 (“To be sure, undercapitalization is one of the 
factors courts commonly consider, which may result in personal liability, when taken in conjunction 
with the factors we discussed earlier, but it is not enough standing alone to pierce the corporate 
veil.”); Presser, supra note 4, at 413 (“The better reasoned cases do suggest that it is unlikely that 
undercapitalization alone is enough to remove the shield of limited liability.”); see also Thompson, 
supra note 3, at 1064 (stating piercing occurs in seventy-three percent of cases where 
undercapitalization is also present). 
 138. See Mary Elisabeth Kors, Altered Egos: Deciphering Substantive Consolidation, 59 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 381, 442–43 (1998). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Compare Mendelson, supra note 105, at 1262, 1264 (“If the corporation has been properly 
capitalized at the outset, later operation with clearly insufficient assets . . . will not suffice to show 
undercapitalization. . . . Similarly, that a corporation lacks sufficient assets even to address liabilities 
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used to discern what constituted adequate capitalization.  Each of these 
concerns is discussed below. 
Undercapitalization has long served as a basis for piercing the 
corporate veil, particularly for cases arising in tort.141  That corporations 
are in fact engaging in a type of injustice by operating with insufficient 
means to pay foreseeable plaintiffs for foreseeable injuries stemming 
from the corporation’s ordinary activities has served as an underlying 
notion for permitting undercapitalization as a means for piercing.142  
Thus, assuming undercapitalization exists, it is a mechanism used by 
corporations in combination with limited liability statutes to completely 
protect all assets from recovery by potential plaintiffs—in effect, both 
the corporation and the shareholders constantly remain judgment proof. 
Given the traditional notions of equity—every wrong deserves a 
remedy143—it is obvious why undercapitalization necessarily could 
create circumstances of injustice.  For instance, imagine corporation A 
sells blasting caps—small, explosive devices regularly used in mining 
activities.  Imagine further that A knows that a particular set of blasting 
caps are especially dangerous due to some defect in their production.  
Rather than ceasing to sell that set of blasting caps, A decides to continue 
selling them while enacting a corporate policy of regularly paying out all 
earnings in dividends.  Years after all of the caps are sold and A has paid 
out all of the dividends, B is injured by one of the caps and sues A.  
While B may win on liability and damages, A is insolvent to pay the 
claims, and, thus, B is out in the cold.144 
                                                                                                                       
likely to flow from its operations generally is insufficient to pierce the corporate veil.”), with Harvey 
Gelb, Piercing the Corporate Veil—The Undercapitalization Factor, 59 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1, 4 
(1983) (“Courts cannot focus solely on initial corporate capital or assets, as some are prone to do, in 
deciding whether inadequacy of assets warrants a decision to pierce because subsequent changes, 
such as increased hazards or reduced assets, may render a determination as to initial inadequacy 
irrelevant.”). 
 141. Campbell, supra note 14, at 39 (“Corporate undercapitalization is often a factor in a court’s 
decision to disregard the corporate entity.”); Presser, supra note 4, at 413 (“The most commonly 
targeted abuse or ‘injustice’ seems to be the failure adequately to capitalize the corporation, to 
operate it in a manner where the corporation’s assets will not be sufficient to meet the obligations to 
creditors.”); Thompson, supra note 3, at 1065; see also Millon, supra note 8, at 1336–37 (“Courts 
have occasionally stated that [undercapitalization] is a sufficient basis for veil piercing.”). 
 142. Gelb, supra note 140, at 3. 
 143. 1 AM. JUR. 2D Actions § 35 (2005) (“It is a principle of the common law that whenever the 
law gives a right or prohibits an injury, it also gives a remedy.”). 
 144. While it could be argued that a plaintiff could reach assets using either 11 U.S.C. § 548 
(2007), or state fraudulent transfer statutes, plaintiffs attempting to use those forms of relief must 
prove an intent prong.  While that prong could be much easier to prove in a context where a 
corporation maintains a level of constant insolvency, relief under those mechanisms is not 
necessarily likely in a scenario where the corporation is not actually aware of potential creditors and 
is seemingly solvent but is nonetheless unreasonably capitalized given the type of business.  
Furthermore, fraudulent transfer actions only permit a plaintiff to attack funds actually transferred—
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While some would argue this is the necessary fallout of limited 
liability statutes, it need not be so.  The piercing doctrine was created in 
the first instance to remedy these exact types of problems by permitting 
plaintiffs to seek recompense from otherwise protected shareholders, 
entities, or both, notwithstanding the otherwise strict prohibition of the 
statute.145  The goal is to serve traditional notions of fairness while still 
achieving the purpose of limited liability in those circumstances when 
corporations are in fact behaving legitimately.146  Thus, permitting 
undercapitalization as a basis of injustice for purposes of a piercing test 
serves a number of goals.  First, it is consistent with traditional notions of 
equity jurisprudence; it is not a large shift in the law that would 
potentially create unforeseeable ripple effects.  Second, it prohibits the 
type of patently unfair conduct described above.  Finally, it acts as a 
deterrent device, providing negative incentives for corporations to 
adequately capitalize. 
2. Defining Undercapitalization 
The remaining, and more difficult question, is how to define the 
flashpoint when a corporation moves from being capitalized to being 
undercapitalized.  This necessarily involves two interrelated questions.  
First, at what moment will capitalization be analyzed, and second, what 
does it mean to be undercapitalized?147 
As to the first, only one moment is relevant to our discussion of 
capitalization—the moment a corporation is legally required to pay a 
judgment.  If the corporation is solvent at that moment, then piercing is 
unnecessary.  If the corporation is insolvent at the moment, then further  
 
                                                                                                                       
they do not permit a plaintiff to attack a corporate shareholder’s personal funds to the extent those 
personal funds are not a portion of the transfer.  See id.  While this perhaps seems legally intuitive, 
permitting a plaintiff to attack a corporate shareholder’s personal funds serves a goal of deterrence 
analogous to that of punitive damages.  That is, the availability of additional liability in this 
circumstance eliminates the economic incentives that could otherwise exist.  Cf. Kemezy v. Peters, 
79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating overdeterrence is a goal of punitive damages because it 
eliminates what could otherwise be a positive cost-benefit analysis). 
 145. See, e.g., Ballantine, supra note 19, at 19 (stating the test is whether the corporation used 
the corporation in good faith for legitimate ends); Presser, supra note 4, at 407 (“It is, or at least once 
was and ought again to be, hornbook law that a shareholder or a parent corporation should not lose 
the protection of limited liability unless that shareholder or parent has somehow ‘abused’ the 
corporate form.”). 
 146. See sources cited supra note 145. 
 147. Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 888–89 (stating the difficult questions raised by 
undercapitalization are what is capital, when is it measured, and how much is enough). 
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analysis is necessary to discern whether the corporation is ripe for 
piercing.  No other moment is probative.148 
At first blush, this notion seems potentially counterintuitive because 
judging a corporation on a singular moment to determine whether its 
capitalization was legitimate ignores a number of other potentially 
probative facts that lead to inevitable “what ifs.”  For example, what if 
the corporation were capitalized adequately, but immediately before the 
judgment, an unforeseeable natural disaster occurs?  Although these 
doomsday scenarios seemingly cause pause, the fundamental question 
deals with them nonetheless—the ultimate inquiry in any piercing case is 
to determine whether a corporation acted legitimately like a separate 
entity intending to continue business.149 
So then, what does a legitimate corporation do when faced with the 
future potential of legal liability?  Initially, a legitimate corporation 
would probably attempt to discern whether legal liability exists, the 
extent of the legal liability, and what funds, if any, exist to pay a 
potential judgment.  If a legitimate corporation then believed liability 
existed, a legitimate corporation would begin holding reserves, either 
through its income in the ordinary course or by sheltering existing 
retained earnings to ultimately pay what could become the judgment.  
Thus, by the time a legitimate corporation could become exposed to a  
 
                                                     
 148. Courts have routinely analyzed undercapitalization at the moment of the entity’s inception.  
Campbell, supra note 14, at 41 (“One problem in undercapitalization cases that has troubled both 
commentators and judges is the determination of the point in time at which undercapitalization is 
measured.  Language from cases generally indicates that the critical time is that of incorporation.”); 
Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 889; Mendelson, supra note 105, at 1262, 1264; Presser, supra note 4, at 
413–14 (“Some courts have expanded this requirement of initial adequate capitalization into an 
obligation to continue to finance the corporation such that its capital remains adequate to meet 
anticipated obligations.  The wiser jurisdictions maintain that the ‘undercapitalization’ question 
should be asked only for the time of incorporation.”).  Contra DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray 
Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 688 (4th Cir. 1976) (supporting the notion that the obligation to 
adequately capitalize is a continuing obligation that exists after formation); Gelb, supra note 140, at 
4 (“Courts cannot focus solely on initial corporate capital or assets, as some are prone to do, in 
deciding whether inadequacy of assets warrants a decision to pierce because subsequent changes, 
such as increased hazards or reduced assets, may render a determination as to initial inadequacy 
irrelevant.”).  Analyzing undercapitalization only at the time of formation is myopic.  For example, 
imagine corporation A forms for the purpose of selling widgets with initial capitalization of one 
million dollars.  Presumably, at this point, A would be solvent for any claims arising from its 
formation.  However, imagine further that A subsequently retains no earnings and, after several 
years, commits some action giving rise to tort liability.  While the corporation followed the 
theoretical law in this instance, the theoretical law was insufficient to serve the goal—to create some 
mechanism for payment of liabilities when the entity is otherwise insolvent.  Rather, the proposal 
would only necessarily serve the goal at the moment of formation, a moment that would only capture 
liabilities arising from formation. 
 149. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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judgment, at the latest, a legitimate corporation would have sufficient 
funds to pay the judgment.150 
Scholars and practitioners alike may criticize this notion—what if the 
corporation has gross assets per fiscal year of one million dollars, net 
assets of $500,000, and potential exposure in a particular piece of 
litigation up to $700,000?  Obviously, this corporation could not raise 
sufficient funds through retaining earnings to pay the judgment, 
assuming the judgment was issued in less than two years.  The response 
here is easier than one might think—the corporation should already have 
retained earnings sheltered for the potential of this type of event.  This 
statement leads to the final inquiry—how much should a legitimate 
corporation retain as capitalization?151 
This has proven to be the most difficult of questions to answer 
because each company’s answer will be different.  That is, a plumbing 
company might retain less than a chemical manufacturer.  A chemical 
manufacturer might retain less than an explosives manufacturer.  An 
explosives manufacturer might retain less than a nuclear facility.  
Furthermore, one chemical manufacturer might retain more than another 
on the basis of business.  Thus, a large chemical manufacturer with 
thousands of clients might retain more than a small chemical 
manufacturer with three clients.  A nuclear facility might retain less 
because it is located in a rural community as opposed to a metropolitan 
area. 
And so, analytically, retention creates other problems.  With too 
much capitalization, the corporation will unnecessarily limit liquidity.  
With too little capitalization, the corporation could expose itself to a 
piercing claim.  In the midst of this prospective dilemma is another 
specter—how can a court decide retrospectively whether a corporation 
made a legitimate choice?  The answer is custom. 
Custom, in the context of tort law, is generally defined as the usual 
manner in which an industry conducts an activity.152  Or, stated another 
                                                     
 150. Of course, this method necessarily reduces liquidity of the corporation by encumbering 
funds.  Nonetheless, when faced with potential legal exposure, that is exactly what legitimate 
corporations should do. 
 151. “Professor Lattin has perhaps accurately described ‘adequate capitalization’ as the amount a 
‘reasonably prudent man with a general knowledge of the particular type of business and its hazards 
would determine was reasonable . . . in light of any special circumstances at the time of 
incorporation . . . .’”  Campbell, supra note 14, at 40 (quoting NORMAN D. LATTIN, THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS 77–78 (2d ed. 1971)). 
 152. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 33 (4th ed. 1971); David G. 
Owen, Proving Negligence in Modern Products Liability Litigation, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003, 1017 
(2004) (“Custom, how a community addresses particular situations according to prevailing social 
norms, is one of the most rudimentary and powerful sources of law.”).  Custom has been defined a 
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way, it is “what is customary and usual in the profession”153 and is 
considered by some as “one of the most rudimentary and powerful 
sources of law.”154  Although custom plays a limited role in a typical 
negligence case—it is only one of several factors used to determine 
breach155—it swallowed the standard of care for purposes of medical 
malpractice actions.156  Thus, in medical malpractice cases, juries 
determine the positive—what the custom is or what physicians normally 
do—instead of the normative—what the custom should be or what 
physicians should do.157  Furthermore, the determination of what the 
custom is, in combination with examining whether the practitioner in 
question complied with the custom, ends the inquiry.158 
Courts should incorporate this doctrine as a means to determine 
whether a corporation sufficiently capitalized itself.  Accordingly, when 
reviewing this element of the test, judges and juries would only review 
whether the corporation had capitalized in a manner consistent with other 
corporations of the same industry, size, and general locale.  If adopted, 
the primary benefit of the doctrine is that it eliminates the retrospective 
guessing of what a corporation should have done—the normative—and 
thereby eliminates the subjectivity, inconsistency, and lack of 
predictability that necessarily follow it.159  Furthermore, because this 
proposal seeks to adopt a well-worn body of law, the potential of 
unforeseen ripple effects is at least less likely.  Finally, the doctrine 
                                                                                                                       
number of different ways in a number of different contexts.  See Jennifer E. Rothman, The 
Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1900–01 n.1 (2007).  For 
more information regarding the development of custom in tort law, see generally Richard A. Epstein, 
The Path to The T. J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (1992). 
 153. PROSSER, supra note 152, § 32. 
 154. Owen, supra note 152, at 1017. 
 155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A (1965). 
 156. Tim Cramm et al., Ascertaining Customary Care in Malpractice Cases: Asking Those Who 
Know, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 702 (2002) (“While in most negligence cases adherence to 
custom is not conclusive proof that no negligence occurred, in the medical malpractice realm 
different rules apply.”). 
 157. Carter L. Williams, Note, Evidence-Based Medicine in the Law Beyond Clinical Practice 
Guidelines: What Effect Will EBM Have on the Standard of Care?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 479, 
500 (2004) (“Under a custom-based standard, practicing in accordance with accepted practice 
generally precludes liability.  Medical malpractice law is unique in this regard because in other areas 
of negligence law, defendants are subject to a standard of reasonable care under the 
circumstances.”). 
 158. Id. at 500–01. 
 159. See Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in 
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 684 (2001) (“[T]he use of custom serves an 
important signaling role in tort law: It reduces the uncertainty facing actors about what level of 
precaution is legally required of them.”); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of 
Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 609 (1998) (stating the doctrine of custom reduces 
hindsight bias). 
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eliminates the need for judges, or juries, to become experts in any 
particular field to determine whether a corporation reasonably 
capitalized.  Rather, judges and juries would need only look to how other 
similar corporations capitalized. 
The remaining problems are those inherent in the doctrine of custom 
itself.  These problems are both practical and theoretical.  As to practical, 
the doctrine raises a number of questions.  For example, how does a 
corporation prove the custom?  Will the custom be national, regional, or 
local?  There is necessarily some fluidity here, but a lawyer could prove 
the custom by proving that a number of other corporations of the same 
industry, the same comparable size, and the same general locale 
maintained similar amounts of liquid capital on a day-to-day basis.  The 
ideal scenario would keep the comparative information as close to the 
locale of the defendant corporation as possible to maintain consistency.  
Or, if an industry lacks comparable corporations locally or regionally, 
similar comparisons could be made nationally.160 
Theoretically, the customs doctrine also carries some baggage.  
Thus, for instance, the most common criticism of custom in the medical 
malpractice context is that it permits doctors to frame their own exposure 
to liability.161  Accordingly, to limit their liability, the customs doctrine 
could encourage physicians to work in a manner less uniform to other 
doctors in their field, even when safety would argue for the opposite.162  
In the corporate context, the argument would presumably be that 
corporations would benefit from the same defect—corporations would 
uniformly set the standard lower than public policy should require. 
While this potential remains, it is unlikely for two reasons.  First, it 
presumes that no corporation would be willing to do more than is 
required by custom as a means to add greater protection from piercing or 
as a means to encourage conservative, long-term investment.  Second, it 
presumes that members of any given industry within any given area 
would come together, conspiratorially, to not only discuss their current 
level of capitalization but also to discuss where to set the benchmark as a 
means to defeat piercing claims.  This seems chimerical at best. 
                                                     
 160. I am admittedly uncomfortable with opening the evidentiary door to a national comparison 
for the obvious problems some such comparisons can muster.  Nevertheless, for some industries, this 
particular problem is unavoidable.  For instance, it will be difficult for lawyers in most areas to find 
a suitable number of local or regional nuclear power plants.  It is simply the nature of that industry. 
 161. Cf. The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (asserting that industries should 
never set their own standards). 
 162. See id. 
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B. Piercing Should Maintain an Element of Unity 
The unity element of the test is simultaneously the most 
controversial and the most dangerous from a predictability and 
consistency perspective.163  This controversy arises because the majority 
of the factors in a factors test seek to discern the existence or absence of 
sufficient unity or control.164  This has led scholars, in hopes of creating 
consistency and predictability, to disavow the element altogether.165  
Nevertheless, the unity test is indispensable.166  Furthermore, courts can 
revamp the unity test itself to increase predictability and consistency. 
The unity test is indispensable because it contains the factors that 
target specific controlling shareholders and leave passive shareholders 
safe from the reaches of piercing.167  For instance, imagine a corporation, 
A, has three shareholders, B, C, and D, and C and D are true passive 
investors—capital contributors who have no role in the management or 
day-to-day operations of the corporation.  B is both a shareholder and 
serves in every officer role for the corporation.  If a plaintiff sues A and 
seeks to pierce A’s corporate veil, the suit should not expose C and D to 
personal liability under any circumstances for they are true passive 
investors. 168  Nevertheless, if no unity requirement exists, nothing would 
separate B from C and D. 
Once we accept that the unity requirement must exist in some form 
to maintain any level of fairness within the piercing doctrine, the 
remaining analysis is whether a formula can be generated that effectively 
measures unity while promoting predictability and consistency. 
At its fundamental base, the unity requirement seeks to determine 
whether the shareholders use the entity as an extension of self—making 
decisions or taking actions that are inherently beneficial to the 
shareholders and not necessarily beneficial to the entity.  This is 
fundamentally another way of asking who controls the entity.169  
                                                     
 163. Millon, supra note 8, at 1330–34. 
 164. See Cane & Burnett, supra note 23, at 666–67. 
 165. See, e.g., Matheson & Eby, supra note 8, at 181–82 (proposing a test that does not include 
unity or control as an independent factor in the codified law). 
 166. Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 865–66. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Shaun M. Klein, Comment, Piercing the Veil of the Limited Liability Company, from Sure 
Bet to Long Shot: Gallinger v. North Star Hospital Mutual Assurance, Ltd., 22 J. CORP. L. 131, 136–
37 (1996) (“When a court disregards the corporate form, only those shareholders responsible for the 
acts justifying the pierce are personally liable for the debts of the corporation.  Passive shareholders 
are not liable.”). 
 169. See Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 507 (“Control is the common (if sometimes implicit) 
feature of all the concepts used to describe cases in which veil piercing is appropriate. . . . Hence, it 
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Traditional piercing analysis uses the factors test to determine control, 
reviewing facts such as the treatment by an individual of the assets of the 
corporation as his or her own, the failure to maintain minutes or adequate 
corporate records, disregard of legal formalities, the failure to maintain 
arm’s length relationships, and many others.170  While these factors 
initially appear relevant and easily operationalized, their application is 
much more complicated in common examples. 
For instance, imagine corporation A has four shareholders, B, C, D, 
and E.  Imagine further that B possesses all officer positions for A, 
maintains separate personal and corporate monetary accounts, does not 
maintain proper minutes or corporate records, and has, on several 
occasions several years ago, engaged in non-arm’s-length transactions 
between himself and the corporation.  Finally, imagine C, D, and E are 
truly passive shareholders.  One day, F, the plaintiff, is injured by one of 
A’s products.  Reviewing the factors above and assuming piercing was 
otherwise appropriate, who would have sufficient unity for piercing?  
Suddenly, the factors stated above seem largely irrelevant.  The first 
factor—whether the shareholders treat the assets of the corporation as 
their own—isn’t really relevant here because even B maintains separate 
monetary accounts.  The second factor—the failure to maintain minutes 
or corporate records—is certainly present here and thus would 
presumably provide at least some support for piercing.  But against 
whom would the court pierce?  All of the shareholders meet that factor.  
Does it serve the goal of piercing to expose them all to liability?  The 
third factor—the disregard of legal formalities—has the same problem.  
It potentially affects all of the shareholders, including the passive ones 
because it attaches the analysis to actions of the entire entity instead of 
actions by the individual shareholders.  Finally, the fourth factor—the 
failure to maintain arm’s length transactions—seems irrelevant here 
because it is only potentially applicable to B, but B has not engaged in 
the conduct in several years.  More importantly, the temporally removed 
conduct is presumably unrelated to F’s injuries. 
If the touchstone of unity is, or should be, control, then the factors 
test is untailored for the purpose for it, at most, determines whether an 
                                                                                                                       
seems clear that control is an essential prerequisite for holding a shareholder liable.”); Gevurtz, 
supra note 32, at 862–63 (describing “two multi-part tests” used to determine “defendant’s 
domination or control over the corporation”); see also Thompson, supra note 3, at 1056 (“The role 
that the individual plays within a corporation also has an effect on the outcome. . . . [I]n the few 
cases that characterized potential defendants as passive shareholders rather than active in the 
business as directors, officers, or otherwise, the courts almost always found no liability.”). 
 170. See Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 856–57 (describing other factors courts use to determine 
control of an entity). 
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entity is ripe for piercing without analyzing whether any individual 
shareholder is ripe for piercing.  Courts should reform the test to analyze 
whether the shareholder, shareholders, or entity that the plaintiff seeks to 
pierce individually possesses the ability through percentage of voting 
shares to make the decision that gave rise to the injustice of 
undercapitalization.  The unity thus becomes tied to the decision as 
opposed to the corporation. 
For instance, imagine a corporation, A, possesses four shareholders, 
B, C, D, and E.  Furthermore, imagine A sells a widget to a third party, F.  
F is subsequently injured by the widget and sues A.  Of course, F 
thereafter learns that A is insolvent and seeks to pierce A.  Which of B, C, 
D, and E are sufficiently unified to justify piercing?  Using traditional 
analysis, the court would review a number of factors in hopes of 
determining which of B, C, and D controlled the corporation in general.  
Of course, the court would also weigh those factors as it saw fit.171  
Under the proposed analysis, only one inquiry would be necessary—who 
controlled the decision giving rise to the injustice?  That, of course, begs 
the question, which decision?  The answer to that question is inherently 
reliant upon the type of underlying injustice.  Thus, for example, if the 
underlying suit is premised upon fraud, then the decision giving rise to 
unity would be the decision to misrepresent material facts.  The same 
would be true for misrepresentation.  In terms of undercapitalization, the 
relevant decision would be one to pay dividends or retain earnings in an 
uncustomary manner. 
This formulation has three positives.  First, it resolves the need for a 
complicated factors test to determine a shareholder’s unity with the 
corporation.  While determining the unity may require detailed review, 
determining the control of a decision requires much less.  Thus, of 
course, it encourages the stated goal of limiting discretion and thereby 
increasing predictability and consistency.  Second, this formulation links 
the conduct giving rise to the liability directly with the plaintiff’s claim, 
which, as discussed below,172 is preferable from a policy perspective.  
Finally, this formulation bears sufficient flexibility to be generally 
applicable to various types of piercing cases.173 
                                                     
 171. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 172. See infra Part V.C. 
 173. Admittedly, this formulation bears its own flaw.  Specifically, there is some discretion for a 
judge to determine which decision gave rise to liability and which shareholders had control, through 
their shares, to reach the decision.  Thus, in terms of predictability and consistency, the possibility of 
asymmetric results certainly exists.  While admittedly this makes the proposal short of perfect, an 
ideal state of objectivity in this regard is not possible.  Instead, the goal should be to limit judicial 
discretion as much as possible to enhance the goals of predictability and consistency while not 
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C. Piercing Should Require Causation 
While causation—the requirement that the plaintiff’s harm stem 
from the wrongful conduct of the defendant—is a necessary element to 
most causes of action, it is not frequently adhered to in piercing cases.174  
In part, this stems from the doctrine’s historical roots.  That is, the 
piercing doctrine is not a true sword in the same manner that a cause of 
action is a sword.  Instead, it is only viable upon a plaintiff’s showing of 
breach of an underlying duty, the insolvency of the entity, and the other 
elements of the doctrine.175  This has led many courts to view the 
elements of injustice and unity as entirely separate elements as opposed 
to elements that must bear a causal relationship.176 
The lack of this requirement goes to the very heart of the 
philosophical inconsistency with the piercing doctrine.  That is, the 
piercing doctrine is premised upon the idea that it would be unfair to 
permit a shareholder to hide behind limited liability.177  Without the 
causation requirement, though, no unfairness could possibly exist.  If the 
corporation is an empty shell used solely for the purpose of doing the 
shareholders’ bidding, but the harm suffered by the plaintiff bears no 
relationship to the unity, then the harm, assuming it exists, is unrelated to 
the manner in which the shareholders conduct the business of the entity.  
Accordingly, that conduct should not compromise the entity’s limited 
liability shield. 
For instance, imagine that corporation A has five shareholders, B, C, 
D, E, and F.  Imagine further that B controls A in every sense of the word 
and meets all unity requirements.  However, C, D, E, and F are true 
passive investors.  Subsequently, B engaged in fraudulent conduct using 
A as a vehicle for the fraud.  Thereafter, A produces a product that harms 
G, a purchaser of a product.  Assume G’s harm is wholly unrelated to B’s 
fraudulent activity.  Additionally, assume B has not engaged in any  
 
                                                                                                                       
compromising the purpose of the test.  Any further objectivity by narrowing the specific type of 
decision would limit the test such that it could not generally apply. 
 174. This element still exists in many instrumentality formulations.  See Caudill, supra note 23, 
at 465–66.  Nevertheless, many courts ignore the requirement.  See Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 862 
(“The notion that there ought to be some causal relationship between the fraud or wrong of the 
defendant, and harm to the plaintiff, is sound, yet, as we have seen above, often forgotten by the 
courts in piercing cases.”). 
 175. See 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 47 (2004) (“[Piercing] is a means of assessing liability 
for the acts of a corporation against an equity holder in the corporation.  It is not itself an action but 
is merely a procedural means of allowing liability on a substantive claim.”). 
 176. See Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 862. 
 177. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
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actual wrongdoing in terms of the control of the corporation that has led 
to G’s injuries. 
Under existing jurisprudence, at least in some jurisdictions, this 
circumstance is sufficient to pierce.178  This result is logically 
inconsistent and is the functional equivalent of “holding a driver liable 
for an accident that occurred in broad daylight because the headlights 
were not in proper working condition.”179  The causation prong would 
solve this problem, ensuring that the behavior by the entity, shareholder, 
or shareholders is the same behavior that gave rise to the plaintiff’s harm.  
On that basis, piercing should require a plaintiff to prove that the 
injustice complained of is in fact the actual and proximate cause of the 
plaintiff’s harm.180 
This proposal has two positives.  First, it solves the logical 
inconsistency associated with permitting plaintiffs to pierce without 
demonstrating that the corporation actually engaged in inappropriate 
conduct related to the plaintiff’s harm.  Second, it encourages predictable 
and consistent application of the causation prong by using jurisprudence 
that is already sufficiently well-worn—standards for actual and 
proximate cause. 
D. Piercing Should Maintain the Element of Insolvency 
The existence of an insolvency requirement is not an actual alteration 
to the law.181  Rather, it would simply solidify the element within the test.  
Nevertheless, the element is a necessary component of the test because it 
prevents compromising an entity’s limited liability shield except where 
necessary to serve the dictates of equity. 
Although limited liability exists statutorily for incorporated entities 
in every jurisdiction in the United States,182 the piercing doctrine is not a 
legislative exception to most of those statutes.183  Furthermore, the 
                                                     
 178. See Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 862. 
 179. Matheson & Eby, supra note 8, at 176 (referring to failure to follow corporate formalities as 
a basis for piercing). 
 180. While it may seem repugnant to introduce tort concepts into the corporate arena, I am not 
the only one who has suggested that this problem is perhaps one more akin to tort.  See Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 
YALE L.J. 1879, 1916–23 (1991). 
 181. Cf. Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 
689 (1990) (stating a plaintiff may not seek equitable remedies until the plaintiff exhausts legal 
remedies). 
 182. See sources cited supra note 16. 
 183. See Morrissey, supra note 5, at 542 (“State statutes typically provide limited liability for 
shareholders unqualified by any reference to [the piercing doctrine].”); Thompson, supra note 3, at 
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piercing doctrine is not an independent statutory cause of action in most 
jurisdictions.184  Instead, the piercing doctrine is a judicial exception 
created through the court’s equity powers.185 
Equity is arguably the oldest type of jurisdiction, as it derives from 
the king.186  Before the existence of courts in England, the king was the 
original and final arbiter of all disputes.187  Thus, the king’s jurisdiction 
was unlimited and completely subject to his own sense of fairness.188  As 
the number of disputes grew, however, the king was increasingly 
incapable of hearing them all.189  Thus, the king began slowly divesting 
judicial responsibilities to others who were charged with carrying out his 
will.190  His position, then, became solely one of ratification or appellate 
review—again, accordingly to his own sense of fairness.191 
As the number of petitions continued to grow, the king began 
delegating authority to Parliament to hear the petitions; Parliament, at 
least at the time, sat as a sessional body called only for specific 
purposes.192  Thereafter, Parliament began delegating authority to hear 
the petitions to various bodies, ultimately leading to the dichotomy 
between courts of equity and courts of law.193  Following the split of law 
and equity, the common law courts and equity courts reached a 
compromise on their jurisdictions.194  Specifically, jurisdiction in the 
equity courts would not exist unless and until a plaintiff had exhausted 
all legal remedies in the common law courts.195  The insolvency 
requirement is simply a corollary to this basic compromise.  Thus, 
plaintiffs are required to seek recompense at law prior to seeking 
recompense in equity.196 
Maintaining this element is both practically and theoretically sound.  
Practically, there is no reason to pierce a corporation’s liability shield if 
the corporation is solvent.  For instance, imagine A, a corporation, 
                                                                                                                       
1041 (“Almost all state corporations statutes simply ignore the whole idea of piercing the corporate 
veil.”). 
 184. Morrissey, supra note 5, at 542. 
 185. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 186. JOSEPH PARKES, A HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 27–29 (1828). 
 187. Id. at 9–10. 
 188. Id. at 10. 
 189. Id. at 11–13. 
 190. Id. at 13. 
 191. Id. at 14–15. 
 192. Id. at 29. 
 193. For a more detailed discussion of the history of equity jurisdiction, see generally id. 
 194. Laycock, supra note 181, at 699. 
 195. See id. at 689. 
 196. See id. 
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engages in fraud against B, and B sues, seeking piercing as a remedy.  
Assuming A is solvent for the debts and for the liability, if any, arising 
from the litigation, courts will not permit B to pierce.  Rather, B will be 
required to seek recompense only from A.  This makes sense because 
none of the shareholders were parties to the contract and A is, in fact, 
solvent. 
Theoretically, this requirement is consistent with traditional equity 
jurisprudence because it limits piercing actions to only those situations 
where no remedy at law exists—situations where the corporation is 
judgment-proof. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For all of the criticisms levied at the piercing doctrine, it is 
unequivocal that it serves a valid goal—to protect plaintiffs against true 
inequity.  Nevertheless, as currently constructed, the piercing doctrine is 
the archetype of mechanisms permitting unwieldy judicial discretion and 
thus inconsistency and a lack of predictability in judgments.  As a result, 
the move towards a conjunctive, objective test is necessary for the 
doctrine to continue holding an analytically legitimate place in the fabric 
of the law.  Without some cabining, however, the doctrine is exposed to 
seemingly credible attacks to its very existence. 
 
